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This study investigates the relationship between CEO network centrality, choice 
of earnings management, and the consequences for the period from 1998 to 2016. From 
our empirical analysis, we find that CEOs with higher network centrality are more likely 
to use accruals-based earnings management, but less likely to use real earnings 
management to manage earnings upward in the current year. Although the use of 
accruals-based earnings management normally results in bad economic consequences for 
firms, CEO network centrality is associated with better (at least not worse) earnings 
quality, after controlling the use of accruals-based earnings management. As for long-
term economic performance, we find that CEO network centrality is related to the future 
growth of profitability that is not accurately forecasted by analysts, so therefore, the firms 
with higher CEO network centrality have positive, long-term market reactions. To sum 
up, we find that CEOs with higher network centrality have flexibility to take risk (by 
using certain form of earnings management).  However, with their abilities (by choosing 
earnings management that fit the firms’ situation or handling the earnings management 
within a certain range), the general outcomes (earnings quality and long-term economic 
performance) are not bad.
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Earnings, as one of the most important fundamental features for corporations, 
pass valuable information for stakeholders to assess the profitability, understand the 
operational efficiency, and make investment decisions related to the firms. In the U.S., 
managers are supposed to follow rules of Generally Accepted Accounting Principal 
(GAAP) to report objective and precise earnings figure.  However, in practice, there is a 
lot of wiggle room available. A substantial amount of literature documents that firms 
incur different forms of earnings management to manipulate earnings and the use of 
earnings management will lead to different (normally bad) economic consequences for 
the firms, such as reduction of earnings quality, future profitability, accuracy of analyst 
estimates, or even long-term future stock performance (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney, 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 
2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Sloan 1996; Teoh, Welch, & 
Wong, 1998a; Collins & Hribar, 2000a; Xie, 2001; Gunny, 2005).  The earnings 
management can come from either different applications of accounting estimates, 
normally called accruals-based earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; 




(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2005), and can be intentional or 
unintentional. 
Most of the literature traditionally assumes operational efficiency within the firms 
and focuses on the examination of the relations between firm-level features and earnings 
management. However, the literature ignores the characteristics of the personnel who 
develop and implement earnings management: top executives (CEO and CFO) of the 
firms. Recent literature shifts attention to the behavioral side of analysis such as ability, 
age, reputation, tenure, and social network of executives (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 
2008; Ali & Zhang, 2015; Griffin et al., 2017). Francis et al. (2008) found that more 
reputed CEOs (proxied by level of press coverage) are associated with poor earnings 
quality (proxied by accruals-based earnings management); Ali and Zhang (2015) found 
that CEOs tend to use earnings management to overstate earnings in the early years than 
in later years of their services; Griffin et al. (2017) found that CEO social network 
induces costs and benefits that cause executives to engage in different forms of earnings 
management. We extend the previous study by examining whether CEO personal 
connection (network centrality) will affect choices of earnings management and whether 
the choices lead to different earnings quality and other economic performances for the 
firms. 
Networks are everywhere (see Figure 1). According to network terminology (as 
shown in the picture), the business world is comprised of NODE (referred to as the 
executives in this study) and LINK (the personal connection between nodes). Personal 
connections are channels that stimulate effective information flows between different 














As a primary decision maker within the firms, executives’ connections, such as 
shared past employment, prior education overlap, or connections through the social club, 
have important indications for the firms’ economic activities. 
In this study, we consider CEOs are connected if they serve on the same board of 
directors of companies, non-profit entities, and government agencies at the same time.1 
Social network issues have attracted significant attention from modern social science 
studies. Literature finds that executives’ network is associated with information flow 
(Rauch & Casella, 2003), enforcement of contract (Kandori, 1992), private debt (Fogel 
et al., 2012), merger and acquisition (El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015), and executives’ 
risk-taking activities (Ferris, Javakhadze, & Rajkovic, 2017).  
All the economic activities are related to the firms’ financial reporting practices, 
including management of earnings. Network centrality measures not only the numbers of 
connections of a person but also the importance of a person within the network. We argue 
that network centrality, a measure of one’s position in the network, should be able to 
capture both information and reputational trust of executives in their network. The 
information and reputational trust are relevant in the CEO’s decision to manage earnings 
by reducing the probability of detection by others, minimizing the cost related to earnings 
management, and increasing the benefit of undetected earnings management. More 
specifically, the information channel allows CEOs to obtain information from the 
network and choose a certain form and level of earnings management that fits the 
company’s current situation. The reputational trust can help increase the benefit of 
                                                 
1Our centrality measurements focus on the current board connection of executives. Our 
measurements may differ from network measurements in other literature by the exclusion of educational or 
other connections. We think the current board connection has a more important indication for executives’ 




undetected earnings management such as the increase of CEO compensation and 
improvement of reputation by delivering “better” earnings to the market.  
However, the benefits from CEOs’ network centrality may not be translated into 
better earnings management decisions for the firms. On the one hand, well-connected 
CEOs care about their reputation, so they will try to prevent reputation loss due to risk-
taking event (earnings management). The social connections help discipline CEOs to 
behave on behalf of stockholders’ best interest. On the other hand, well-connected (or 
saying “more centralized”) CEOs may receive less internal monitoring (such as board 
monitoring) and external obstacles (such as less severe consequence from labor market), 
thus inducing them to engage in risk-taking activities that may harm the firm in the long 
run. That is why we are interested in whether well-connected CEOs will participate in 
earnings management (one type of risk-taking activities) and the related consequence. 
In this study, we examine the relation between CEO network centrality, their 
choices of earnings management methods, and the related outcomes. More specifically, 
we ask whether “more centralized” CEOs will use earnings management to manipulate 
earnings, and if so, what type of earnings management method they choose, and whether 
the use of earnings management will negatively affect the overall earnings quality and 
economic performance of the firms.  
To study the relation between CEO network centrality and earnings management, 
we first construct four basic measurements of CEOs network centrality. We not only 
investigate the role of size (degree centrality) of each CEO’s network, but also consider 
the importance of the CEO in the network, such as distance between CEOs and other 




between the other two executives (betweenness centrality), and the influence of CEOs 
network due to the importance of their direct connections (eigenvalue centrality). Using 
Boardex data of past and present board position of North American executives, we 
construct degree, eigenvector, betweenness, and closeness centralities for all executives 
in the network for the span of 1998-2016. In addition, we use principal component 
analysis of both raw and percentile figures to form two additional centrality 
measurements (PCA-Raw and PCA-Perc) to capture the common features of four 
centrality measurements.2  We only keep the sample related to CEOs of the firms for 
further analysis. 
Following the previous literature (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari 
et al., 2005; Chen, Lin, & Lin, 2008; Francis & Yu, 2009; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen 
et al., 2008), we also construct variables as proxies for accruals-based earnings 
management (predicted by performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) Model) and real 
earnings management (predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) Model). We exclude firms in 
regulated industries (with SIC codes 4000-4999) and financial companies (SIC codes 
6000-6999) in our empirical analysis. We find that firms with “more centralized” CEOs 
are more likely to use accruals-based earnings management but are less likely to use real 
earnings management to manage earnings upward in the current year after controlling the 
factors that affect the use of earnings management, including the substitute effect 
between these two methods (Zang, 2012; Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu, 2015; Black, Joo, & 
Schmarkebeck, 2017).  
                                                 
2 We include two additional centrality measurements, cumulative degree and cumulative 




 The result is robust in the post-SOX period (after 2003). Previous literature finds 
evidence that managers tend to use more real earnings management in the post-SOX 
period and that managers intend to avoid accruals-based earnings management due to 
more severe potential cost to the firms (Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015; Black et al., 2017; 
Griffin et al., 2017). This paper finds the results contradictory to the evidence 
documented by the previous literature. The result is also robust for the use of a different 
proxy for performance-matched accruals-based earnings management, the use of lagged 
centrality figure (to take care of endogeneity concern), and the exclusion of observations 
in CEO turnover years. 
Next, we are interested in examining whether the use of accruals-based earnings 
management will lead to a reduction of earnings quality for firms because of the natural 
link between earnings management and earnings quality. We use Beneish (1999) m_score 
and Dechow (2011) F scores as proxies for earnings quality of firms because these two 
scores have been commonly used in both academic and practical fields to detect earnings 
manipulation (that may lead to negative potential outcomes for firms), material 
accounting misstatements or even predict future bankruptcy probability. The higher the 
scores, the higher the probability that the firms are engaging in earnings manipulation. 
Following the previous literature, we first construct raw scores, then we create an 
indicator variable that equals one if the scores lie in the top quartile of the scores of all 
firms in year t.3  
                                                 
3 The interpretation for Beneish (1999) m_score is that if a firm has m_score of higher than -2.22, 
the firm is more likely to be a manipulator. The minimum m_score in the top quartile of m_score in the 
dataset is -2.05 that is higher than the cutoff value of -2.22. Being in the top quartile of m_score indicates 
that a firm is more likely to be a manipulator. In the untabulated test, we also use a higher than cutoff value 




Overall, we find that CEO network centrality is related to better (or at least not 
bad) earnings quality. More specifically, as for results related to the m_score, we find that 
more centralized CEOs are associated with a significantly lower probability of being in 
the top quartile of the m_score (better earnings quality) after controlling the use of 
accruals-based earnings management (or discretionary accruals).  As for the results 
related to the F scores, we find that although CEO centrality has an insignificant relation 
to the F scores, when interacted with the use of earnings management, the probability of 
being in the top quartile of F scores turns significantly negative. It is worth noting that in 
regressions related to both scores, as expected, earnings management has a significantly 
positive relation with the dependent variable (being in the top quartile of the scores). The 
results are robust in using all three different types of regression (linear probability, logit, 
and probit models).  We only report the results related to the logit regression model.  
We further explore the economic performance related to the use of accruals-based 
earnings management. Previous literature has contradictory findings towards the relation 
between CEO network centrality and economic performance, but normally finds that the 
use of earnings management will lead to bad economic performance (e.g. reduction in 
future profitability, accuracy of analyst estimates, or even long-term future stock 
performance). We are interested in seeing whether CEOs’ network centrality will lead to 
better or worse economic performance for firms using earnings management. First, we 
use change in one-year-ahead return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for future profitability. 
In all regressions, in addition to controlling for variables that will affect the change of 
future ROA, we include interaction terms between centrality and discretionary accruals, 




ROA from one year prior to the current year), to capture the interaction effect of 
centrality on discretionary accruals and change in current ROA.4  
We find that, in all regressions, change in the current ROA and the use of 
accruals-based earnings management will lead to significant reduction of change in future 
ROA. Except for Degree centrality (having significantly positive coefficient), centrality 
measurements will not have a significant effect on the change of future ROA; however, 
when interacting with the change in the current ROA, we do observe the significantly 
positive effect on interaction terms. The interaction effect on discretionary accruals is 
insignificant as well. Overall, we find that CEO network centrality has a positive effect 
on the growth of future ROA when interacting with the current change in ROA but has an 
insignificant effect when interacting with discretionary accruals.  The change in future 
profitability may be a risk factor to affect the future stock performance of firms if the 
information is not currently forecasted by analysts covering the firms.  
Next, we are interested in seeing whether analysts may be able to forecast the 
future EPS accurately for firms based on the current information. After controlling other 
factors affecting the accuracy of analysts’ forecast suggested by the literature (e.g. 
Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki, 2004; Guay, Kothari, & Shu, 2011; So, 2012; Core, Guay, 
& Rusticus, 2006; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Wang, 2013; Brown, 2001; Zhang, 2006; Larcker, 
So, & Wang, 2013), we find that, in all regressions, discretionary accruals are 
significantly correlated to negative analyst forecast error (or saying negative earnings 
surprise) while most CEO network centrality measurements, as well as the interaction 
terms between centrality and discretionary accruals, are significantly correlated to 
                                                 
4 The purpose to include the interactions between the current change of ROA and centrality 




positive analyst forecast errors (in essence, positive earnings surprise). The results from 
the previous two portions reflect that there may be an unexpected shift in the firms’ (with 
higher CEO network centrality) fundamentals that may not be forecasted by analysts.  
Therefore, there may be a potential current market under-reaction to stocks of those 
firms. That is why we are interested in examining the long-term market reaction of the 
firms in the next step.  
Following the previous literature (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Gunny, 2005), we use 
one-year-ahead size-adjusted return (as dependent variable) as a proxy for long-term 
stock market reaction to the firms to run pooled regression, and control for factors that 
are found to affect long-term stock performance (e.g. Beta, Book-to-Market Equity ratio, 
the natural log of market equity, and earnings-to-price ratio). Again, we include the 
interaction terms between centrality and discretionary accruals to capture interaction 
effects. Not surprisingly, in all regressions, we find that both centrality and interaction 
terms have a significantly positive relationship while discretionary accruals have a 
significantly negative relationship with long-term stock performance. The results are 
robust by using the Fama-MatBech (1973) cross-sectional regression, and by the 
exclusion of the transition year. In short, we find that firms with better-connected CEOs 
on average earn substantially higher future size-adjusted return compared to firms with 
less-connected CEOs. We interpret this positive centrality-return relation as evidence 
that, holding other constant, firms on average enjoy long-term benefit (or stock market 
reaction) from having better-connected CEOs.  
Therefore, we conclude that the “more centralized” CEOs are likely to use 




Jones (1991) Model. Compared to CEOs with lower network centrality, CEOs with 
higher network centrality will reduce the probability of being in the top quartile of 
m_score (Beneish, 1999) and F scores (Dechow et al., 2011) when they use discretionary 
accruals; therefore, CEOs with higher network centrality are associated with higher (at 
least not worse) earnings quality. In addition, for firms with higher CEO network 
centrality, there is potential growth of future profitability that is not accurately forecasted 
by current analysts, so it leads to positive long-term market reactions (proxied by one-
year-ahead size-adjusted market return).   
Our findings have several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to 
behavioral literature by finding that CEO network centrality affects the firms’ choice of 
earnings management (one type of company economic activities). Since the choice of 
earnings management is closely related to financial reporting practice, we document 
evidence that CEO network centrality affects the firms’ financial reporting practice. 
Griffen et al. (2017) also found CEOs’ network size affects the firms’ choice of earnings 
management.  However, their method to construct CEOs’ network is different from ours.5  
Also, our findings (related to the choice of earnings management methods) are opposite 
to theirs. 
Next, we shed light on the choice of accruals-based earnings management to 
manage earnings upward in the current year by CEOs with higher network centrality. The 
use of accruals-based earnings management has normally been considered to induce 
higher potential cost to firms and can be easily detected by SEC (Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 
2015; Black et al., 2017; Griffin et al., 2017), so firms normally try to avoid the use of it 
                                                 
5 Social network measurements in Griffen et al. (2017) include educational connections but our 




or shift to the use of real earnings management. However, our evidence shows that CEOs 
with higher network centrality can handle the use of accruals-based earnings management 
within a certain range, and the results are not bad (not bad earnings quality, not bad 
market reactions). 
Finally, similar to the previous literature (Faleye, Kovacs, & Venkateswaran, 
2014; Ferris et al., 2017), we confirm that firms with higher CEO network centrality 
involve more risk-taking activities (proxied by the use of earnings management).  
However, the risk-taking will not cause a bad consequence. It is worth noting that 
although network centrality is related to mostly positive results, it cannot fundamentally 
change the negative effect earnings management brought to the firms (e.g. controlled for 
network centrality is not able to remove the significant effect related to discretionary 
accruals). The results draw us a more complete picture towards understanding the effects 
of top executives’ network centrality on the firms.   
The rest of the paper will be organized in the following format: Chapter 2 
discusses the previous literature and develop hypotheses; Chapter 3 is an introduction of 
key variables and sample construction; Chapter 4 presents our research design and main 
empirical results; Chapter 5 provides additional analysis from robustness check; Chapter 












CEO Network Centrality and Choice of Earnings  
Management Method 
 
A network consists of individuals and links between them. Information flows 
through a network by personal connections (or links). The network position for an 
individual is neither random nor equivalent. Individuals will be considered as in a “more 
centralized” position if they (1) have more links to other nodes, (2) have a shorter 
distance to other nodes, (3) stay in the shortest paths between any other two nodes, and 
(4) have more links to other high-connected nodes. “More centralized” individuals should 
have advantages in obtaining and distributing information, as well as certain bargaining 
power (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Therefore, CEOs with “more centralized” position in 
the network can create more effective information channels with lower information 
gathering costs (Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998), and allow information sharing (Nohria, 
1992).  In addition, networks enable trust transaction by assisting in sending out more 
“trustworthy” information (Burt, 1997, 2005) so they can help enhance reputation and 
enforce good behavior. Overall, a “more centralized” CEO should have information 




A growing amount of the literature shows that top executives’ social network can 
have significant influence on the firms’ financial policies, such as board monitoring 
(Fracassi & Tate, 2012), merger and acquisition (El-Khatib et al., 2015), private debt 
(Fogel et al., 2015), capital investment (Fracassi, 2016), choices of earnings management 
(Griffin et al., 2017), management forecast accuracy (Hong et al., 2017), and executive 
compensation (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2013). The firms’ financial policies are 
closely related to the firms’ financial disclosure practices, including the management of 
earnings. In addition, Ferris et al. (2017) find that a CEO’s network has important 
implication towards corporate risk-taking activities. Earnings management, according to 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), is defined as “managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting practice.” By its nature, 
earnings management is one type of corporate risk-taking activities. That is why we posit 
that these CEOs’ network centrality firms’ earnings management may be related, so we 
have our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: CEOs with higher network centrality are more likely to use earnings 
management in the firms.  
There are different methods to manage earnings, including the different 
applications of accounting estimates and methods, such as management of accruals 
(window dressing for profitability), and alternation of operation, such as acceleration of 
sales or other revenues and delaying of operational expense. The first method is normally 




earnings management. Although the application of both earnings management methods 
can achieve the short-term earnings-increase target, different forms of earnings 
management have a different focus so they will result in different consequences that are 
potential costs to the firms in the long run. The literature shows that the use of accruals-
based earnings management can increase the likelihood of a firm in violating GAAP and 
result in Securities and Exchange Commission’s litigation against a firm (e.g. Karpoff 
et al., 2008; Ducharme et al., 2004; Gong et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Coram et al. (2016) 
also show in their survey result that top executives have viewed accruals-based earnings 
management as a questionable tool. The use of real earnings management, however, 
allows managers to achieve short-term goals without manipulation of accruals so it would 
reduce the likelihood of being detected by SEC or other litigation organizations.  
Therefore, the literature has found the substitute effect for the use of accruals-
based earnings management and real earnings management, especially in the post SOX 
period. (Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015; Black et al., 2017). Despite the low probability of 
being detected, alteration of a firm’s operational activities may still result in certain 
potential cost for a firm in the long run, by skipping valuable projects with positive NPV 
for purpose of managing earnings to meet or beat the target (Gunny, 2005; Griffen et al., 
2017). In short, both forms of earnings management result in certain potential costs to the 
firms, but the question remains indeterminable as to which form of earnings management 
induces more potential costs to firms.  
As stated in a previous paragraph, CEOs with a “more centralized position” in the 
network should have information advantage and reputational trust within the network. 




choose a certain form and level of earnings management that fits the company’s current 
situation. The reputational trust can help increase the benefit of undetected earnings 
management such as the increase of CEO compensation and improvement of reputation 
by delivering “better” earnings to the market. According to the reputational theory, “more 
centralized” CEOs care about their reputation so they will try to prevent reputation loss. 
The social connections help discipline CEOs to behave on behalf of stockholders’ best 
interest.  
However, agency theory predicts the opposite result. “More centralized” CEOs 
may receive less internal monitoring (such as board monitoring) and external obstacles 
(such as less severe consequence from the labor market), so they may use earnings 
management to benefit themselves rather than the firms and stockholders. Therefore, we 
posit that a “more centralized” CEO may prefer a certain form of earnings management 
to the other one. As a related topic to our first hypothesis,6 we hypothesize that:  
H1a: CEOs with higher network centrality prefer to use certain form of 
earnings management method than the other form. 
 
CEO Network Centrality, Earnings Management,  
and the Related Consequence 
 
As stated above, although “more centralized” CEOs have informational advantage 
and reputational trust within the network, the benefits from CEOs’ network centrality 
may not be translated into good consequences for the firms. El-Khatib et al. (2015) show 
that “more centralized” CEOs are more likely to initiate successful M&A activities, but 
those M&A activities are proven to be value destroying for both parties. Engelberg et al. 
                                                 
6 This is a dual hypothesis. “More centralized” CEO could prefer either one form of earnings 




(2012), Karolyi (2017), and Fogel et al. (2015), however, document that connections of 
executives result in lower loan spread. We are interested in seeing whether there is any 
difference in the consequence related to the use of earnings management initiated by 
CEOs with different network centrality.  
The first consequence of using earnings management (regardless of any forms) is 
to affect the earnings quality of a firm. Earnings management and earnings quality are 
closely related, and as a result, some literature uses earnings management as a proxy for 
earnings quality. However, earnings quality is a considerably complicated topic and is 
contingent upon decision making. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 
states that “Financial reporting should provide information about an enterprise’s financial 
performance during a period.” In accounting language, earnings quality can be defined as 
the “ability to predict future earnings,” the “ability to reflect underlying economic 
effects,” or the “ability to provide information about a firm’s financial performance.” 
Earnings persistence, accruals, earnings’ smoothness, timeliness loss avoidance, investor 
responsiveness, restatements and SEC enforcement release can be proxies for earnings 
quality (Dechow et al., 2010).7 Since CEOs with higher network centrality has 
information advantage within their network, they may be able to learn from their network 
what earnings management method is more efficient and apply that in their firms. Also, 
they may have the ability to handle the use of earnings management within a certain 
range and still provide good “information” to the public about the firms’ financial 
performance. Based on the previous discussion, we hypothesize that: 
                                                 
7 We use Beneish (1999) m_score and Dechow et al. (2011) F scores as proxies for earnings 




H2: “More centralized” CEOs may not be related to bad earnings quality with 
the use of earnings management.  
Literature shows that the use of both forms of earnings management will lead to 
the bad economic performance of firms in the long run, such as reduction in future 
profitability or even long-term stock market performance (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; 
Gunny, 2005). However, social network literature also shows that firms with well-
connection boards (top executives as part of the board) earn superior risk-adjusted stock 
returns because those firms experience higher future growth in ROA that cannot be 
accurately forecasted by current analysts (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013). That is why we 
are interested in examining whether there is any difference in the long-term economic 
performance of firms with the use of earnings management initiated by CEOs with 
different network centrality including change (or growth) in future profitability, earnings 
persistence, analyst forecast, or even long-term stock market performance. All the topics 
are closely related to earnings “information” provided by the firms (or saying the quality 
of the information provided by current earnings). CEOs with higher network centrality 
should have information that is an advantage within their network and can handle the use 
of earnings management within a certain range to provide better “information” to the 
public; therefore, the subsequent performance should be better or at least not worse. We 
have our last hypothesis: 
H3: “More centralized” CEOs may not be related to bad subsequent economic 










Description of Key Variables 
 
CEO Network Centrality 
 
We use CEOs’ past employment links in the U.S. listed firms to form four 
measurements for CEO network centrality. Four common measures of centrality are (1) 
degree (number of direct ties with others in the network), (2) eigenvector (importance of 
an individual in the network), (3) betweenness (how often an individual lies on the 
shortest distance between the other two members), and (4) closeness (inverse of the sum 
of shortest distances between one individual and other individuals in the network) (El-
Khatib et al., 2015). We calculate four measurements of centrality as: 
Degree (Di) = ∑j≠iXij,                                                (1) 
where Xji is 1 for presence of a social connection between i and j 
Eigenvector (Ei) = satisfying λE’E=E’AE,                            (2) 
where E is an eigenvector of the matrix of connections A, and λ is its associated 
eigenvalue. Ei is taken as the elements of the eigenvector E* associated with A’s 
principal eigenvalue, λ*. 
Betweenness (Bk) = ∑i<j≠k∈N 
𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑘)/𝑔𝑖𝑗
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)/2




where gij is 1 for any geodesic connecting I and j, and gij(k) is assigned a value if the 
geodesic between I and j also passes through k.  






,                                          (4) 
where dij is the shortest distance between nodes I and j, n is the size of the component i 
belongs to, and N is the size of the yearly network. 
To make the centrality measures more comparable, we generate percentile values 
of centrality measures annually as measurements for CEO network centrality. In addition, 
we use principal component analysis of both raw and percentile figures to form two 
additional centrality measurements (PCA-Raw and PCA-Perc) to capture the common 
features of four centrality measurements. 
Table 1 provides some examples of CEOs with different network centrality. Rex 
Wayne Tillerson (CEO of ExxonMobil) and William (Bill) C. Weldon (CEO of Johnson 
& Johnson) are examples of CEOs with high network centrality (with nearly 100% 
ranking for each of the four centrality measurements). In 2010, Tillerson and Weldon had 
board connections of 2,066 and 1,485 respectively and were connected to some important 
“connections” too (e.g. Weldon served on board of JP Morgan Chase). Actually, both 
Tillerson and Weldon were connected because Weldon also served on the board of Exxon 
that year. David M Wood (CEO of Murphy Oil Corp) is an example of a CEO with 
medium level network centrality (with around 50%-60% ranking for different centrality 








Examples of CEOs with Different Level of Network Centrality 
Picture 
    
Name Rex Wayne 
Tillerson 
William (Bill) C. 
Weldon 




Chairman and CEO 
of ExxonMobil 
from 2006 to 2017  
CEO of Johnson & 
Johnson from 2002 
to 2012 
CEO of Murphy Oil 
Corp from 2009 to 
2012 
Founder and CEO 
of New Oriental 
Education & 
Technology Group 
Inc (NYSE: EDU) 






































Served on board of 
trustees of 






Served as a 
member of the 
executive 
committee of The 
Business Council; 
Being a long-term 
volunteer and 
served as national 
president for 
the Boy Scouts of 
America (BSA) 
Served on the board 
of director for 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., HeartFlow, 
ExxonMobil and 
the board of trustees 
for Quinnipiac 
University 
Served on the board 







Equity GP LLC, 
Deep Gulf Energy 
LP, and Berkana 
Energy 
















In the year 2006, 
Exxon had 80,000 
employees, did 
business in nearly 
200 countries, and 
had annual revenue 






with Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and 
the United Arab 
Emirates. In 2009, 
ExxonMobil 
acquired XTO 
Energy, a major 
natural gas 
producer, for 
$31 billion in 
stock. Michael 
Corkery of 
the Wall Street 
Journal wrote that 
"Tillerson's legacy 
rides on the XTO 
Deal." Tillerson 
retired from Exxon 
effective January 1, 
2017, and became 
Secretary of State. 
As CEO, Weldon 
completed some of 
the largest 
acquisitions in the 
company's history,  
including the 
purchase 
of Alza and Pfizer's 
consumer-health 
product line.  
In Weldon's first 




$32.3 billion to 
$36.3 billion and 
net earnings from 
$5.7 billion to $6.6 
billion. In 2011, his 
last full year as 
CEO, revenues 
were $44.7 billion 
and net earnings 
were $9.7 billion.  
Under Wood’s 
leadership, Murphy 
sold two refineries 
(one in Wisconsin 
and one in 
Louisiana) in 2011 
and tried to focus on 
international 
exploration in 
places around the 
world, such as 
Congo, Suriname, 
Indonesia, Brunei, 
or even Iraq. 
However, the 
exploration 
campaign turned out 
to be a big 
disappointment for 
Murphy and 





price has about a 
negative 20% return 
for the year 2011.  
Yu’s first 
established New 
Oriental School in 
1993 and converted 




Inc in 2003, stock of 
which was first 
traded in NYSE 
starting 2006. As 
the largest provider 
of private 
educational services 













education. Yu is 
known as the 






Although he served as a board member for some companies, those companies 
were mostly small to medium-size oil companies (e.g. Crestwood Midstream GP LLC, 
Crestwood Equity GP LLC, Deep Gulf Energy LP, and Berkana Energy). Minhong 
(Michele) Yu (Founder and CEO of New Oriental Education & Technology Group, Inc. 
(NYSE: EDU)) is an example of a CEO with low network centrality (with under 20% 
ranking in nearly all the centrality measurements). In 2010, he only served on the board 




Earnings Management (Accruals-Based  
Earnings Management and Real  
Earnings Management) 
 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management  
As for proxy for performance-matched accruals-based earnings management, we 
follow the previous literature to calculate discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow 
et al.,1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Francis & Yu, 2009). Specifically, we 
use the residual from the cross-sectional modified Jones model to estimate discretionary 
accruals. In addition, we follow Chen et al. (2008) and Francis and Yu (2009) to include 
the current operating income scaled by lagged total assets in the model.8  For each year 
and industry (by 2-digit SIC code), we run cross-sectional regression as: 
TlAcct=α+β1*(1/ATt-1)+ β 2 *(ΔRevt - ΔRect) +β 3*ΔPP&Et+ β 4*NIt+Ԑt,       (5)     
where TlAcct = total accruals of a firm at year t, calculated as difference between income 
before extraordinary items and operating cash flow;  
ATt-1 = total asset at the end of year t-1;  
ΔRevt = change in sales revenue for a firm at year t;  
ΔRect = change in receivables for a firm at year t;  
ΔPP&Et = change in PP&E for a firm at year t;  
Nit = operating income in year t. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets 
The residual from the above regression is discretionary (abnormal) accruals of a 
firm. The higher values indicate a higher level of accruals-based earnings management. 
We only keep the data with more than 15 observations by each SIC code and year.  
                                                 





Real Earnings Management 
As for proxy for real earnings management, we use three main real earnings 
management measures commonly used in the previous research. (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2005; Zang, 2011). Roychowdhury (2006) divides the real 
activities manipulation (to manage earnings upward) into three categories: sales 
manipulation, reduction of discretionary expenditures, and reduction of Cost of Goods 
Sold (COGS) due to overproduction and measures real earnings management as an 
abnormal level of operational cash flow, production cost, and discretionary expenditures. 
The normal operational cash flow is modeled as: 
CFOt/ Att-1=α+β1*(1/ Att-1) + β 2*(St/Att-1) + β 3*(ΔSt/Att-1) + Ԑt                 (6) 
where CFO = operating cash flow for a firm at year t; 
Att-1 = a firm’s total assets at year t-1; 
St = net sales of a firm at year t; 
ΔSt = change in net sale of a firm at year t.  
The normal production cost is modeled as: 
PRODt /Att-1= α+β1*(1/ Att-1) +β 2*(St/ATt-1)+β 3*(ΔSt/ATt-1)+β 4*(ΔSt/ATt-1)+ Ԑt    (7) 
where PRODt =cost of goods sold of a firm in year t plus change in inventory of a firm in 
year t, and other variables as are defined before.  
The normal discretionary expenditure is modeled as: 
DisExpt /Att-1= α+β1*(1/ Att-1)+β 2*(St-1/ATt-1)+ Ԑt                                        (8) 
where DisExpt = total amount of selling, general, and administrative expenses, R&D, 




The regressions (6), (7), and (8) are run by each year and industry (by 2-digits 
SIC code). The “abnormal” measures are defined as actual amounts minus the “normal” 
amounts predicted by the three formulas above. If managers manage earnings upward by 
acceleration of revenue recognition, the actual cash flow from operation should be less 
than the normal cash flow amount predicted for the inflated sales revenues, so the more 
negative value for error term predicted by formula (6) indicates a higher level of real 
earnings management.  If managers manage earnings upward by overproduction of 
inventory, although the per-unit cost of goods sold seems to be lower, the company may 
incur additional production and holding cost that are not recovered in the same period 
through sales. As a result, the total annual production and holding cost relative to sales 
should be higher than the normal amount predicted by formula (7); therefore, the more 
positive value for error term predicted by formula (7) indicates a higher level of real 
earnings management. 
If managers manage earnings upward by cutting or delaying discretionary 
expenditure (e.g. R&D, capital, advertising, and selling and administrative expense), the 
actual discretionary expenditure spending should be less than the normal amount 
predicted by formula (8), so the more negative value for error term predicted by formula 
(8) indicates a higher level of real earnings management. Following Roychowdhury, 
(2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), we define real earnings management as abnormal PROD 
minus abnormal C/F and abnormal DisExp. The higher values (or saying more positive 
values) indicate a higher level of real earnings management to manage earnings upward 





Earnings Quality (Beneish (1999)  
m_score and Dechow et al.  
(2001) Fscore) 
 
In this study, we use Beneish (1999) m_score and Dechow et al. (2011) F scores 
as proxies for earnings quality because m_score and F scores are proven, by both 
academic and practice, to be a better method to detect earnings manipulations and 
material accounting misstatements. For both scores, we first calculate the raw scores and 
then generate quartile of raw scores for each year. Finally, we generate an indicator 
variable that equals one if the score of a firm lies in the top quartile of the score in year t. 
We think being in the top quartile of each score can be a good proxy for the poor earnings 
quality of a firm.9 
Beneish (1999) m_score 
Following Beneish (1999), we construct m_score in the following formula 
M_score= -4.84+0.92*DSRI+0.528*GMI+0.404*AQI+0.892*SGI+0.115*DEPI- 
0.172*SGAI+4.679*TATA -0.327*LVGI,                                  (9) 
 
where DSRI (Days Sales in Receivables Index) = [Receivablest/Salest]/[ Receivablest-
1/Salest-1]; 
GMI (Gross Margin Index) = [(Salest-1-CIGSt-1)/Salest-1]/ [(Salest-CIGSt)/Salest]; 
AQI (Asset Quality Index) = [1-(Current Assett+PP&Et)/Assetst]/ [1-(Current 
Assett-1+PP&Et-1)/Assetst-1]; 
SGI (Sales Growth Index) = Salest/Salest-1; 
DEPI (Depreciation Index) = [Depreciationt-1/(Depreciationt-1+PP&Et-1)] 
/[Depreciationt / (Depreciationt + PP&Et)]; 
                                                 
9 Summary statistics show that predicted probabilities of misstatements for firms in 75 percentiles 
of F scores are about 1.5(2.5) times than the 50(25) percentile figures. Therefore, being in the top quartile 




SGAI (Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index) = [SG&A expenset/ 
Salest]/ [SG&A expenset-1/ Salest-1]; 
TATA (Total Accruals to Total Asset) = [Income before Extraodinary itemst-Cash 
Flow from Operationst]/ Assetst; 
LVGI (Leverage Index) = [(LT Debtt+Current Liabilityt)/ Assetst]/ [(LT Debtt-
1+Current Liabilityt-1)/ Assetst-1 ] 
The indication for m_score is that if a firm m_score is higher than -2.22 in year t, 
the firm is likely to participate in earnings manipulation. The higher the m_score, the 
higher the probability in earnings manipulation.   
Dechow et al. (2011) Fscores 
Following Dechow et al. 2011, we create Fscores in a series of steps. First, we 
calculate the predicted values using the following regressions: 
PV1= -7.893+0.790*rsst+2.518*Δrec+1.191*Δinv+1.979*soft_assets 
+0.171*Δcs -0.932*Δroa+1.029*issue,                                            (10) 
 
where Rsst = accruals from Richardson et al. (2005);  
Δrec = (Receivablest-Receivablest-1)/[(Assetst+Assetst-1)/2]; 
Δinv = (Inventoryt-Inventoryt-1)/[(Assetst+Assetst-1)/2]; 
Soft_assets = (Assetst-PPEt-Cash and cash equivalentst)/Assetst; 
Δcs = (Salest-Recevablest)/ (Salest-1-Recevablest-1); 
ΔROA = [Net Income from Operating Activitiest/(Assetst+Assetst-1)/2]/ [Net 
Income from Operating Activitiest-1/(Assetst-1+Assetst-2)/2]; 






PV2 = -8.252+0.665*rsst+2.457*Δrec+1.393*Δinv+2.011*soft_assets 
+0.159*Δcs-1.029*Δroa+0.983*issue-0.150*Δemp+0.419*leasedum,         (11) 
 
where Δemp = No. of Employeet / No. of Employeet-1; 
Leasedum = Indicator variable equals to one if there are future operating lease 
obligations, zero otherwise. 
PV3 = -7.966+0.909*rsst+1.731*Δrec+1.447*Δinv+2.265*soft_ 
assets+0.160*Δcs -1.455*Δroa+0.651*issue-0.121 
 *Δemp+0.345*leasedum +0.082*rett+0.098*rett-1,                   (12) 
 
where rett and rett-1 represents market-adjusted stock return in year t and year t-1. 





                                                    (13) 
We use the predicted probability to proxy for Fscores in Dechow et al. 2011.10 





We collect data from a variety of databases. We construct centrality measures 
with available data from BoardEx from 1998-2016.  BoardEx contains social network 
information such as social connections, education background, and employment history, 
as well as tenure information of board members and top executives of all firms in the 
U.S.  We first downloaded information for all top executives listed firms from the U.S. 
                                                 
10 Dechow et al. (2011) use predicted probabilities of misstatements scaled on the unconditional 
probability of misstatements for all firms to obtain F scores. However, the unconditional probabilities of 
misstatements are specific in their sample period of 1982-2005. Our sample period is different from theirs, 




and constructed centrality measurements based on past employment links. Then we kept 
only available data related to the CEOs. The main sample from BoardEx contains 62,837 
firm-year observations with available centrality information. 
Next, we obtain the firms’ accounting and financial information from Compustat 
to construct earnings management, earnings quality, size-adjusted return information, and 
other controlled variables, separately. We also collected analyst estimation information 
I/B/E/S to calculate analyst forecast error (earnings surprise). Finally, we merged other 
datasets into our main dataset by Compustat identifier (GVKEY), or CUSIP, and year to 
construct our final dataset for empirical study.11 All the variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% levels to eliminate the impact of the extreme value of variables in the 
regression. Following the previous literature, we excluded the firms in financial (SIC 
6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC 4400-4499) for the empirical study.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. In part A, we can see that the mean 
(median) value of a sampled CEO is in the 62nd (63rd), 55th (56th), 64th (73rd), and 53rd 
(53rd) percentile rank among all BoardEx-tracked executives and directors using degree, 
eigenvector, betweenness, and closeness as measures of centrality. The average (median) 
value for accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management is -0.9% 
(-1.2%) and -5% (-4.6%) of assets, respectively.  It is also worth noting that the 75 
percentile of m_score value is -2.05 which is higher than the -2.22, the cutoff value to 
define a manipulator.   
  
                                                 
11 We merge the BoardEx dataset with Compustat dataset by linking CompanyID (from BoardEx) 
to GVKEY (from Compustat). In addition, BoardEx provides the International Securities Identification 
Number (ISIN) for firms with stock quotes. We can extract CUSIP from ISIN and match it with Compustat 
header CUSIP to form our main dataset. Since CRSP and I/B/E/S use 8-digit CUSIP. We use 8-digit 









Variables N mean sd p25 p50 p75
Accruals_EMG 41660 -0.0087 0.1587 -0.0720 -0.0129 0.0376
REAL_EMG 39926 -0.0500 0.3942 -0.2440 -0.0462 0.1133
m_score_high 27106 0.2105 0.4077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fscore1_high 35812 0.2514 0.4338 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Fscore2_high 33306 0.2548 0.4357 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Fscore3_high 28985 0.2474 0.4315 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ch_roa_lead1 49672 0.0002 0.2549 -0.0187 0.0000 0.0153
Forecast_Error_lead1 30805 -0.0082 0.1642 -0.0063 0.0000 0.0034
Size_ret_lead1 51859 -0.3037 1.0486 -0.5450 -0.2200 0.0362
Degree 62837 61.5211 21.8271 49.0000 63.0000 78.0000
Eigenvector 62837 54.5062 24.9298 35.0000 56.0000 75.0000
Betweenness 62837 63.6197 29.7432 38.0000 73.0000 90.0000
Closeness 62837 53.1421 25.8965 33.0000 53.0000 73.0000
PCA-Raw 62837 57.3592 27.8763 33.0000 58.0000 83.0000
PCA-Perc 62837 0.5233 1.6001 -0.6492 0.5745 1.8090
Size 54725 6.4900 2.3929 4.8616 6.4358 7.9651
BTM 46614 0.5730 1.0650 0.2600 0.4909 0.8116
ROA 54245 -0.0554 0.3661 -0.0315 0.0138 0.0589
Leverage 54540 0.1783 0.2166 0.0030 0.1002 0.2821
ROAstd 53050 0.0979 0.2604 0.0101 0.0314 0.0913
CFstd 50684 0.0762 0.1338 0.0163 0.0386 0.0824
Cycle 36002 -1.6741 6.7439 0.0082 0.0562 0.1144
Growth 49612 0.3333 2.3347 -0.0376 0.0687 0.2174
Big4 57527 0.6436 0.4789 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Tenure 65565 4.2021 4.9431 1.0000 3.0000 6.0000
Duality 65565 0.3304 0.4704 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Coverage 34293 3.1217 1.1942 2.3979 3.2189 3.9890
Annural_ret 50677 0.1320 0.8435 -0.2009 0.0552 0.3102
Op_loss 65565 0.2777 0.4479 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Firmage 34864 1.9035 1.0047 1.0986 2.1972 2.7081
Horizon 34996 5.2790 0.3648 5.2396 5.3460 5.4340
Beta 51932 0.9854 0.9208 0.4241 0.8594 1.3857
Ln_mkv 48323 6.0224 2.2340 4.4299 5.9165 7.4711
EP_ratio 48280 -0.1311 0.8075 -0.0477 0.0344 0.0646
Part. A Main Variables




The value for a 75 percentile of F scores is about 1.5 (2.5) times of the value for 
50 (25) percentile, indicating that the probability of misstatement for firms in the 75 
percentile of F scores is 1.5 (2.5) times of the probability of misstatement for firms in the 
50 (25) percentile of F scores.  
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for key variables. It is not surprising that all 
centrality measurements are highly correlated to each other. Network centrality is also 
highly correlated to the firm’s size (Size), Return on Assets (ROA), and the firm’s 
leverage (Leverage).  It is also interesting to see that discretionary accruals are positively 
correlated to while centrality measurements are negatively correlated to the top quartile 
of m_score and F scores.  Discretionary accruals are also negatively correlated to while 
centrality measurements are positively correlated to future the growth in ROA, analyst 






Table 3  
 
Correlation Matrix for Key Variables  
 




m_score_high 0.1350 -0.0268 1.0000
0.00 0.00
Fscore1_high 0.0285 0.0854 0.0660 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00
Fscore2_high 0.0163 0.0863 0.0495 0.9067 1.0000
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fscore3_high 0.0144 0.0943 0.0405 0.8867 0.9158 1.0000
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ch_roa_lead1 -0.0833 0.0978 -0.0705 0.0113 0.0086 0.0152 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.02
Forecast_Error_lead1 -0.0671 -0.0647 -0.0252 -0.0042 -0.0055 -0.0095 0.0715 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.46 0.23 0.00
Size_ret_lead1 -0.0647 -0.0673 -0.0255 -0.0102 -0.0115 -0.0082 0.0537 0.0394 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.00 0.00
Degree -0.0624 -0.0469 -0.1229 0.0224 0.0414 0.0373 0.0093 0.0341 0.0859 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
Eigenvector -0.0505 -0.0446 -0.1086 0.0107 0.0232 0.0197 0.0093 0.0262 0.0866 0.7797 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Betweenness -0.0414 -0.0262 -0.0884 0.0104 0.0245 0.0206 0.0076 0.0195 0.0709 0.7229 0.6287 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Closeness -0.0571 -0.0588 -0.1210 0.0017 0.0157 0.0114 0.0106 0.0323 0.0995 0.8328 0.9012 0.7163 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCA-Raw -0.0468 -0.0441 -0.1147 -0.0011 0.0107 0.0024 -0.0087 0.0233 0.1148 0.6482 0.5621 0.6283 0.6533 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.07 0.71 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PCA_Perc -0.0576 -0.0482 -0.1205 0.0119 0.0281 0.0237 0.0101 0.0305 0.0943 0.9126 0.9101 0.8537 0.9510 0.6876 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Size -0.2080 -0.1280 -0.1739 0.0499 0.0622 0.0546 -0.0264 0.0621 0.1932 0.4122 0.3658 0.3302 0.4408 0.4210 0.6876 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BTM 0.0069 0.0419 -0.0040 0.0129 0.0043 0.0124 -0.0554 0.0142 -0.0365 -0.0771 -0.0718 -0.0599 -0.0782 -0.0611 0.4210 0.0048 1.0000
0.21 0.00 0.55 0.03 0.47 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37
ROA -0.2130 -0.3449 -0.0214 0.0373 0.0359 0.0355 -0.4090 0.0974 0.0833 0.0639 0.0417 0.0159 0.0359 0.0301 -0.0611 0.3916 0.1361 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leverage 0.0068 0.0699 -0.1152 0.0610 0.0718 0.0642 0.0211 0.0098 0.0304 0.1248 0.1225 0.0990 0.1183 0.1146 0.0301 0.2594 -0.1935 -0.0141 1.0000
0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Tenure -0.0282 -0.0366 -0.0323 -0.0075 -0.0074 -0.0005 -0.0111 0.0132 -0.0135 -0.0484 -0.0497 -0.0501 -0.0474 -0.0491 0.1146 -0.0301 0.0176 0.0842 -0.0139 1.0000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.21 0.94 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Duality -0.0129 -0.0044 0.0449 0.0404 0.0351 0.0327 0.0012 -0.0122 -0.0157 0.0120 0.0058 0.0261 0.0103 -0.0401 -0.0491 -0.0314 0.0132 0.0238 -0.0118 0.2116 1.0000












RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
CEO Network Centrality and Choice of Earnings Management 
 
We combine the tests of H1 and H1a. More specifically, to test whether “more 
centralized” CEOs will use earnings management and what form of earnings 
management they prefer, we regress both forms of earnings management on CEO 
network centrality and other controlled variables (including the other form of earnings 
management) in a pooled regression. The regression is shown as: 
Regress (Earnings Management) = β0+β1Centrality+β2Controls (including 
industry and year fixed effect)                                      (14) 
 
The dependent variables are two different forms of earnings management 
(accruals-based, and real earnings management). Our variable-of-interests are the 
centrality measurements. To separate the effect of CEO network centrality on the choice 
of earnings management from other factors, we include firm-level characteristics that are 
found to affect the use of earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 
2011, Dechow & Dichev. 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Griffin et al., 2017; Zang, 2012; 
Chan et al., 2015). More specifically, we include the firm’s size (SIZE), leverage 




firm (Kothari et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Barth et al. (1999), Skinner and Sloan 
(2002), and Zang (2012) find that the incentives to report higher earnings figure increase 
with the firms’ growth potential; therefore, we include Book-to-Market equity ratio 
(BTM) to control the firms’ growth potential. We also control the firms’ volatility of 
profitability (ROAstd) and cash flow (CFstd) because firms are more likely to incur 
earnings management in a volatile performance environment. Following Zang (2012) and 
Chan et al. (2015), we include Growth of sale (Growth) and use of the “Big Four” 
accounting firms as an auditor (Big4) to control for cost of earnings management. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest that longer operating cycles indicate more 
operational uncertainty that may lead to the use of earnings management, so we also 
include firms’ operating cycle (Cycle) in the regression. 
Following Ali and Zhang (2015), we also control the other CEO characteristics 
such as how many years the CEO is in the position (Tenure), and whether the CEO serves 
as the board director (Duality). Finally, we add the other form of earnings management in 
the regression to capture the substitution effect between different forms of earnings 
management (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). All regressions include time and industry 
fixed effect. Errors robust to the firm’s heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. 
It is worth noting that since all four centrality measurements are closely correlated 
to each other, we only include one centrality measurement in each regression. In addition, 
we use the principal component analysis of all four centrality measurements to obtain two 
additional centrality measurements. The variables capture the commonality of all four 
centrality measurements. We will include all six centrality measurements in the rest of 





Table 4 reports the results of pooled regressions of CEO network centrality, on 
Accruals-based Earnings Management (predicted by performance-matched Modified 
Jones (1991) Model).  As can be seen from the table, the coefficients for all centrality 
measurements are positive and highly significant (p < 0.05). Set Degree centrality 
(column (1)) as an example to illustrate the marginal effect: holding others constant, on 
average, a one unit (1%) increase in centrality will lead to an increase of management of 
earnings through accruals that equals about 0.014% of the total assets. The value equals 
about 1.5% of the mean value of discretionary accruals (about -0.9%) in the whole 
sample. Of all the controlled variables other than the other form of earnings management, 
only Size, Leverage, ROAstd, CFstd, and Big4 show significant statistical relation (even 
positive or negative) with the dependent variable. The results from Table 4 present that, 
holding other constant, CEOs with higher network centrality are more likely to use 
accruals-based earnings management. 
Table 5 reports the results of pooled regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Real Earnings Management (predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) Model).  As can be seen 
from the table, the coefficients for all centrality measurements are negative and highly 
significant (p < 0.01).  Set Degree centrality (column (1)) as an example to illustrate the 
marginal effect: holding other constant, on average, a one unit (1%) increase in centrality 
will lead to a decrease of management of earnings through real activities that equals 
about 0.05% of total assets. The value equals about 1% of the mean value of 
discretionary accruals (about -5%) in the whole sample.  Most of the controlled variables 
show significant statistical relation (even positive or negative) with the dependent 






CEO Network Centrality and Accruals-based Earnings Management (performance-
matched Modified Jones (1991) Model), 1998-2016 
 
 













REAL_EMG 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158***
(31.14) (31.15) (31.17) (31.20) (31.20) (31.16)
Size -0.00919*** -0.00939*** -0.00928*** -0.0101*** -0.00983*** -0.00966***
(-11.98) (-12.36) (-12.63) (-12.47) (-12.72) (-12.26)
BTM -0.00168 -0.00165 -0.00169 -0.00155 -0.00163 -0.00160
(-1.46) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.35) (-1.43) (-1.40)
ROA 0.00489 0.00529 0.00528 0.00646 0.00590 0.00578
(0.34) (0.37) (0.37) (0.45) (0.41) (0.40)
Leverage 0.0177*** 0.0176*** 0.0176*** 0.0180*** 0.0182*** 0.0177***
(3.01) (2.99) (2.99) (3.05) (3.08) (3.00)
ROAstd -0.0425*** -0.0426*** -0.0427*** -0.0426*** -0.0427*** -0.0427***
(-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-2.69) (-2.68)
CFstd 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.259***
(7.79) (7.79) (7.79) (7.78) (7.79) (7.79)
Cycle 0.00302 0.00303 0.00305 0.00301 0.00301 0.00304
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65)
Growth 0.00136 0.00136 0.00136 0.00137 0.00138 0.00137
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.75) (0.75) (0.74)
Big4 0.00836*** 0.00805*** 0.00820*** 0.00764*** 0.00847*** 0.00791***
(3.52) (3.39) (3.44) (3.22) (3.57) (3.33)
Tenure -0.000149 -0.000143 -0.000143 -0.000140 -0.000138 -0.000137
(-0.97) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-0.90) (-0.90)
Duality -0.00219 -0.00227 -0.00238 -0.00265 -0.00282 -0.00249
(-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.32) (-1.46) (-1.55) (-1.38)
_cons 0.0153 0.0146 0.0148 0.0142 0.0151 0.0214**
(1.46) (1.39) (1.41) (1.36) (1.44) (2.01)
N 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861
adj. R-sq 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.262 0.261 0.261
Industry Fixed Effect includedYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Accruals-based Earnings Management (predicted by performance-matched Modified 
Jones (1991) Model). The dependent variable is accruals-based earnings management, 
defined as discretionary accruals that are predicted by error term of regression suggested 
by the performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) Model. CEO network centrality is 
measured by Degree in column (1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column 
(3), Closeness in column (4), Principal component portion of raw centrality in column 
(5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All 
regressions include controlled variables as REAL_EMG (Real Earnings Management as 
predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) Model), Size (the natural log of total assets), BTM 
(Book-to-market equity ratio), ROA (return on assets), Leverage (total debt scaled by 
total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation of return on assets of last three years), CFstd 
(cash flow volatility in last three years), Cycle (days of Operating cycle divided by 1000), 
Growth (sales growth in year t), Big4 (indicator variable that equals one if audited by 
“Big Four” auditor), Tenure (numbers of years the executive is in the position), and 
Duality (indicator variable that equals one if CEO also serves as board chair in year t). 
All regressions include time, industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to a firm’s 
heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the 
coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to Table 4 is shown as: 



























Accruals_EMG 0.968*** 0.969*** 0.969*** 0.970*** 0.970*** 0.969***
(32.41) (32.43) (32.44) (32.50) (32.46) (32.45)
Size 0.0161*** 0.0166*** 0.0151*** 0.0191*** 0.0164*** 0.0174***
(10.61) (11.15) (10.36) (12.18) (10.65) (11.32)
BTM 0.0291*** 0.0291*** 0.0295*** 0.0287*** 0.0293*** 0.0289***
(10.85) (10.81) (10.93) (10.76) (10.92) (10.80)
ROA -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.420*** -0.425*** -0.421*** -0.422***
(-21.57) (-21.59) (-21.63) (-21.60) (-21.67) (-21.57)
Leverage 0.0674*** 0.0678*** 0.0677*** 0.0660*** 0.0661*** 0.0675***
(5.62) (5.65) (5.64) (5.51) (5.50) (5.63)
ROAstd -0.0417 -0.0416 -0.0416 -0.0411 -0.0415 -0.0411
(-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.52) (-1.50)
CFstd 0.0195 0.0213 0.0193 0.0227 0.0197 0.0207
(0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) (0.39)
Cycle 0.00612** 0.00610** 0.00606** 0.00615** 0.00616** 0.00606**
(2.00) (2.01) (1.96) (2.06) (2.00) (1.99)
Growth 0.00452 0.00451 0.00456 0.00448 0.00452 0.00449
(1.31) (1.31) (1.33) (1.30) (1.31) (1.31)
Big4 -0.0623*** -0.0610*** -0.0627*** -0.0597*** -0.0637*** -0.0608***
(-10.85) (-10.62) (-10.89) (-10.40) (-11.08) (-10.58)
Tenure -0.00139*** -0.00141*** -0.00137*** -0.00140*** -0.00138*** -0.00142***
(-3.45) (-3.48) (-3.40) (-3.47) (-3.40) (-3.52)
Duality 0.00934** 0.00945** 0.00926** 0.0108** 0.0102** 0.0103**
(2.09) (2.12) (2.07) (2.43) (2.27) (2.30)
_cons -0.0100 -0.00934 -0.0157 -0.0102 -0.0178 -0.0420
(-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.58) (-0.38) (-0.66) (-1.55)
N 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861
adj. R-sq 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.323 0.322 0.322
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Real Earnings Management (predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) Model). The dependent 
variable is real earnings management, predicted by abnormal production cost minus 
abnormal cash flow and abnormal discretionary expense, suggested by Roychowdhury 
(2006) Model. CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column (1), 
Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), 
Cumulative Degree in column (5), Principal component portion of raw centrality in 
column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All 
regressions include controlled variables as All regressions include controlled variables as 
Accruals_EMG (Accruals-based Earnings Management as predicted by performance-
matched Modified Jones (1991) Model), Size (the natural log of total assets), BTM 
(Book-to-market equity ratio), ROA (return on assets), Leverage (total debt scaled by 
total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation of return on assets of last three years), CFstd 
(cash flow volatility in last three years), Cycle (days of Operating cycle divided by 1000), 
Growth (sales growth in year t), Big4 (indicator variable that equals one if audited by 
“Big Four” auditor), Tenure (numbers of years the executive is in the position), and 
Duality (indicator variable that equals one if CEO also serves as board chair in year t). 
All regressions include time, industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to a firm’s 
heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the 
coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to Table 5 is shown as: 




Real earnings management happens in firms with a larger size, while accruals-
based earnings management happens in firms with a smaller size.12 Consistent with 
previous literature (Griffen et al., 2017), we also find that common firm-level 
characteristics have different effects on firms’ decision to use different forms of earnings 
management. The results from Table 5 show that, holding other constant, CEOs with 
higher network centrality are less likely to use real earnings management. Combine the 
results from Tables 4 and 5 together, we conclude that firms with “more centralized” 
CEOs are more likely to use accruals-based earnings management but less likely to use 
real earnings management to manage earnings upward. 
We decompose the real earnings management into three components and further 
analyze the relationship between CEO network centrality and the individual component 
of real earnings management. Tables 6 to 8 present the results. Results from Table 5 
show that all network centrality measurements have a significantly negative relation with 
real earnings management; therefore, we predict that the network centrality 
measurements should have a significantly positive, negative, and positive relationship 
with abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production cost, and abnormal 
discretionary expenditure, respectively. Results from Tables 7 and 8 confirm our 
prediction that the network centrality measurements have significantly negative  
(p < 0.01) and significantly positive (p < 0.01) relation with abnormal production cost 
and abnormal discretionary expenditure; however, results from Table 6 are somewhat 
contradictory to our prediction (Column 1 and 2) or indeterminant (Column 3 to 6).  
  
                                                 
12 The regression to estimate performance-matched accruals-based earnings management include 
includes current ROA. That’s why we see ROA has an insignificant coefficient. If we use lagged ROA in 























Accruals_EMG -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.815***
(-41.04) (-41.02) (-41.02) (-41.01) (-41.00) (-41.01)
Size 0.00211*** 0.00184** 0.00117 0.00169** 0.00120 0.00171**
(2.61) (2.34) (1.52) (2.04) (1.49) (2.10)
BTM -0.00121 -0.00114 -0.000990 -0.00109 -0.00100 -0.00110
(-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.12) (-1.23) (-1.13) (-1.24)
ROA 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.336***
(24.88) (24.90) (24.95) (24.81) (24.95) (24.82)
Leverage 0.00934 0.00940 0.00924 0.00920 0.00935 0.00932
(1.57) (1.58) (1.56) (1.55) (1.57) (1.57)
ROAstd -0.0152 -0.0153 -0.0156 -0.0154 -0.0155 -0.0153
(-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.77)
CFstd -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.168*** -0.167***
(-4.47) (-4.46) (-4.47) (-4.46) (-4.47) (-4.46)
Cycle 0.000874 0.000876 0.000902 0.000888 0.000890 0.000878
(0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Growth -0.00436* -0.00435* -0.00433* -0.00434* -0.00433* -0.00435*
(-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.74) (-1.75)
Big4 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0136*** 0.0141*** 0.0137*** 0.0141***
(5.49) (5.50) (5.20) (5.39) (5.27) (5.40)
Tenure 0.000777*** 0.000783*** 0.000802*** 0.000792*** 0.000799*** 0.000788***
(5.59) (5.62) (5.77) (5.68) (5.73) (5.66)
Duality -0.00143 -0.00161 -0.00200 -0.00167 -0.00196 -0.00163
(-0.72) (-0.81) (-1.00) (-0.83) (-0.97) (-0.81)
_cons -0.0290** -0.0310** -0.0345*** -0.0327*** -0.0339*** -0.0356***
(-2.29) (-2.46) (-2.75) (-2.60) (-2.70) (-2.79)
N 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861
adj. R-sq 0.653 0.653 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Abnormal Operating Cash Flow. The dependent variable is abnormal operating cash 
flow, error term predicted by Formula (6). CEO network centrality is measured by 
Degree in column (1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness 
in column (4), Cumulative Degree in column (5), Principal component portion of raw 
centrality in column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in 
column (6). All regressions include controlled variables as Accruals_EMG (Accruals-
based Earnings Management as predicted by the performance-matched Modified Jones 
(1991) Model), Size (the natural log of total assets), BTM (Book-to-market equity ratio), 
ROA (return on assets), Leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), ROAstd (standard 
deviation of return on assets of last three years), CFstd (cash flow volatility in last three 
years), Cycle (days of Operating cycle divided by 1000), Growth (sales growth in year t), 
Big4 (indicator variable that equals one if audited by “Big Four” auditor), Tenure 
(numbers of years the executive is in the position), and Duality (indicator variable that 
equals one if CEO also serves as board chair in year t). All regressions include time, 
industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to a firm’s heteroscedasticity are reported in 
parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is designated as ***, 
**, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to Table 6 is shown as: 








CEO Network Centrality and Abnormal Production Cost, 1998-2016 
 
 













Accruals_EMG 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.318***
(13.47) (13.47) (13.50) (13.51) (13.52) (13.49)
Size 0.0160*** 0.0163*** 0.0149*** 0.0180*** 0.0158*** 0.0169***
(13.82) (14.31) (13.20) (15.03) (13.41) (14.30)
BTM 0.0216*** 0.0215*** 0.0219*** 0.0213*** 0.0218*** 0.0215***
(11.02) (10.97) (11.14) (10.92) (11.14) (10.97)
ROA -0.190*** -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.193*** -0.190*** -0.191***
(-12.76) (-12.75) (-12.74) (-12.82) (-12.77) (-12.79)
Leverage 0.0358*** 0.0362*** 0.0361*** 0.0347*** 0.0348*** 0.0359***
(3.77) (3.81) (3.79) (3.66) (3.66) (3.78)
ROAstd -0.0462* -0.0462* -0.0463* -0.0459* -0.0463* -0.0459*
(-1.93) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.91)
CFstd 0.0824* 0.0840* 0.0822* 0.0849* 0.0826* 0.0834*
(1.89) (1.92) (1.88) (1.93) (1.89) (1.90)
Cycle 0.00780** 0.00778** 0.00776** 0.00783** 0.00784** 0.00775**
(2.55) (2.54) (2.54) (2.54) (2.57) (2.52)
Growth 0.00817*** 0.00817*** 0.00822*** 0.00815*** 0.00819*** 0.00816***
(3.10) (3.10) (3.12) (3.09) (3.11) (3.09)
Big4 -0.0230*** -0.0220*** -0.0236*** -0.0212*** -0.0243*** -0.0220***
(-5.17) (-4.93) (-5.28) (-4.76) (-5.45) (-4.92)
Tenure -0.00000236 -0.0000123 0.0000195 -0.00000292 0.0000203 -0.0000183
(-0.01) (-0.04) (0.07) (-0.01) (0.07) (-0.06)
Duality 0.00292 0.00296 0.00265 0.00393 0.00331 0.00356
(0.86) (0.88) (0.78) (1.16) (0.97) (1.05)
_cons -0.0446** -0.0447** -0.0511** -0.0465** -0.0528** -0.0719***
(-2.13) (-2.13) (-2.44) (-2.23) (-2.54) (-3.43)
N 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861
adj. R-sq 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.134 0.131 0.132
Industry Fixed Effect includedYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 7 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Abnormal Production Cost. The dependent variable is abnormal production cost, error 
term predicted by Formula (7). CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column 
(1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), 
Cumulative Degree in column (5), Principal component portion of raw centrality in 
column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All 
regressions include controlled variables as Accruals_EMG (Accruals-based Earnings 
Management as predicted by performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) Model), Size 
(the natural log of total assets), BTM (Book-to-market equity ratio), ROA (return on 
assets), Leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation of return 
on assets of last three years), CFstd (cash flow volatility in last three years), Cycle (days 
of Operating cycle divided by 1000), Growth (sales growth in year t), Big4 (indicator 
variable that equals one if audited by “Big Four” auditor), Tenure (numbers of years the 
executive is in the position), and Duality (indicator variable that equals one if CEO also 
serves as board chair in year t). All regressions include time, industry, and firm fixed 
effect. Errors robust to a firm’s heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed 
statistical significance of the coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to Table 7 is shown as: 








CEO Network Centrality and Abnormal Discretionary Expenditure, 1998-2016 
 
 













Accruals_EMG 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.112***
(8.94) (8.94) (8.91) (8.92) (8.90) (8.92)
Size -0.00406*** -0.00405*** -0.00316*** -0.00470*** -0.00363*** -0.00421***
(-8.07) (-8.21) (-6.54) (-9.00) (-7.23) (-8.21)
BTM -0.00715*** -0.00717*** -0.00740*** -0.00710*** -0.00734*** -0.00717***
(-7.88) (-7.90) (-8.08) (-7.86) (-8.04) (-7.89)
ROA -0.0931*** -0.0929*** -0.0941*** -0.0920*** -0.0936*** -0.0926***
(-11.24) (-11.25) (-11.32) (-11.15) (-11.28) (-11.18)
Leverage -0.0441*** -0.0443*** -0.0442*** -0.0436*** -0.0437*** -0.0442***
(-9.79) (-9.81) (-9.78) (-9.68) (-9.66) (-9.79)
ROAstd 0.00185 0.00189 0.00208 0.00181 0.00199 0.00176
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
CFstd 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.223*** 0.222***
(9.19) (9.18) (9.18) (9.17) (9.17) (9.18)
Cycle 0.0000740 0.0000801 0.0000746 0.0000565 0.0000522 0.0000908
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Growth 0.00484*** 0.00484*** 0.00481*** 0.00484*** 0.00482*** 0.00484***
(4.42) (4.42) (4.38) (4.43) (4.39) (4.42)
Big4 0.0286*** 0.0282*** 0.0292*** 0.0280*** 0.0294*** 0.0283***
(15.37) (15.18) (15.66) (15.06) (15.74) (15.22)
Tenure 0.000346*** 0.000347*** 0.000325*** 0.000340*** 0.000328*** 0.000347***
(3.32) (3.33) (3.11) (3.26) (3.13) (3.33)
Duality -0.00515*** -0.00509*** -0.00476*** -0.00546*** -0.00513*** -0.00532***
(-3.70) (-3.66) (-3.40) (-3.92) (-3.66) (-3.81)
_cons 0.00383 0.00479 0.00905 0.00615 0.00910 0.0176**
(0.47) (0.59) (1.11) (0.76) (1.12) (2.15)
N 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861 23861
adj. R-sq 0.362 0.362 0.361 0.363 0.361 0.362
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 8 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality on 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenditure. The dependent variable is abnormal discretionary 
expenditure, error term predicted by Formula (8). CEO network centrality is measured by 
Degree in column (1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness 
in column (4), Cumulative Degree in column (5), Principal component portion of raw 
centrality in column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in 
column (6). All regressions include controlled variables as Accruals_EMG (Accruals-
based Earnings Management as predicted by performance-matched Modified Jones 
(1991) Model), Size (the natural log of total assets), BTM (Book-to-market equity ratio), 
ROA (return on assets), Leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), ROAstd (standard 
deviation of return on assets of last three years), CFstd (cash flow volatility in last three 
years), Cycle (days of Operating cycle divided by 1000), Growth (sales growth in year t), 
Big4 (indicator variable that equals one if audited by “Big Four” auditor), Tenure 
(numbers of years the executive is in the position), and Duality (indicator variable that 
equals one if CEO also serves as board chair in year t). All regressions include time, 
industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to a firm’s heteroscedasticity are reported in 
parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is designated as ***, 
**, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to this table is shown as: 





We would not be surprised that this happens, because, as discussed in 
Roychowdhury (2006), operating cash flow may also be affected by overproduction and 
reduction in discretionary expenditure, so the individual use of abnormal operating cash 
flow as a proxy for the real earnings management may contain some noisy terms. From 
Tables 6 to 8, we conclude that firms with “more centralized” CEOs are less likely to 
manage earnings upward by overproduction and reduction in discretionary expenditures. 
Combine the results from Tables 4 to 8 together, we can see that firms with “more 
centralized” CEOs are more likely to use accruals-based earnings management but less 
likely to use real earnings management, especially by the use of overproduction and 
reduction in discretionary expenditure, to manage earnings upward. As we all know, the 
investment in R&D and capital assets may be risky and the amount of investment will be 
required by GAAP to be categorized as current expenses.  Therefore, the investment in 
R&D and capital assets will lead to lower current earnings figure. However, the investment 
in R&D and capital expenditure will benefit the companies in the long run by allowing the 
companies to have better development potential. From the empirical results, we can see 
that the “more centralized” CEOs will keep their normal investment in R&D and capital 
assets (by less likely to use real earnings management), which seems to be risky but will 
benefit the companies in the long run. 
However, in order to meet the earnings targets, they may need to use a certain level 
of accruals-based earnings management (e.g. extension of useful life of PP&E) to manage 
the current earnings figure upward. In this way, the firms would not suffer from a potential 
bad impact caused by the panic of the capital market about not meeting earnings targets. 




enforcement bodies, such as SEC, because the “window-dressing” earnings information 
may change investors’ inception towards the companies. However, it would not cause an 
overall change of total expenses.  Instead, it just averages those expenses for a longer period 
to lower current expenses. Furthermore, the use of accruals-based earnings management 
would not cause any sacrifice of future development potential either. 
CEO Network Centrality, Earnings Management,   
and Earnings Quality 
 
After we obtain the result of what form of earnings management that “more 
centralized” CEOs prefer, we will test whether CEOs’ network centrality will be 
associated with higher or lower earnings quality with the use of earnings’ management. 
As stated in Chapter 3, we use being in the top quartile of m_score and F scores as 
proxies for earnings quality; therefore, to test the hypothesis, we use the following logit 
models: 
Logit(EarningsQuality)=µ0+µ1EarningsManagement+µ2Centrality+µ3Interaction 
+ µ4 Controls (including industry and year fixed effect)                   (15) 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if m_score or F 
scores for a firm lies in the top quartile of m_score or Fs cores in year t. In this 
regression, our interest is the sign and significance level for coefficients of earnings 
management (or called discretionary accruals), centrality, and interactions between them. 
We also control for firm-level characteristics that may affect the firms’ earnings quality, 
such as firm size (SIZE), standard deviation of ROA (ROAstd), leverage (Leverage), 
whether firms use “Big Four” accounting firms as auditor (Big4), and whether the firm 




Theoretically, if a firm uses earnings management, the earnings quality should be 
reduced; therefore, the coefficients of the variable of earnings management (plus a 
portion from interactions) should be positive and significant. However, if “more 
centralized” CEOs can choose the earnings management method that fits the situation of 
the firms, and can make full use of their informational advantage, the outcome should not 
be even worse. Therefore, we predict that the coefficient for centrality (plus a portion 
from interactions) should be negative and significant, or at least the coefficient for 
interactions should be negative and significant. The worse scenario is that “more 
centralized” CEOs may not be able to fundamentally change the reduced earnings quality 
situation due to the use of earnings management.  At least, they will not make the 
situation even worse.  Therefore, the coefficient related to centrality (including centrality 
and interactions) should not be positive and significant.  
Table 9 reports the results related to the m_score. As can be seen from the table, 
coefficients of discretionary accruals (including a portion from interaction terms) are 
significantly positive (p < 0.01) in all columns, while coefficients of all centrality 
measurements (including a portion from interaction term) are significantly negative 
(p < 1). Set Degree centrality (column (1)) is used as an example to illustrate the marginal 
effect: Holding other variables constant and at mean value, on average, a one unit (1%) 
increase in centrality will lead to a decrease of 0.11% probability to being in the top 
quartile of m_score (or being a manipulator). The interaction term between discretionary 













Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG 1.364*** 1.619*** 1.464*** 1.619*** 1.998*** 2.020***

























Size -0.114*** -0.120*** -0.125*** -0.111*** -0.103*** -0.0975***
(-6.33) (-6.82) (-7.09) (-6.13) (-6.16) (-5.85)
ROAstd 1.160*** 1.162*** 1.150*** 1.167*** 1.119*** 1.141***
(5.31) (5.29) (5.31) (5.28) (5.36) (5.39)
Leverage -1.144*** -1.159*** -1.165*** -1.170*** -1.106*** -1.080***
(-8.76) (-8.85) (-8.88) (-8.90) (-9.33) (-9.16)
Big4 0.0859 0.0907 0.0728 0.0898 0.0546 0.0803
(1.45) (1.53) (1.23) (1.51) (0.98) (1.44)
Op_loss -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.230*** -0.222*** -0.236*** -0.230***
(-4.38) (-4.37) (-4.44) (-4.30) (-4.83) (-4.71)
_cons -0.127 -0.211 -0.251 -0.252 -0.285 -0.565
(-0.35) (-0.59) (-0.70) (-0.72) (-0.80) (-1.59)
N 22766 22766 22766 22766 25400 25400
pseudo R-sq 0.100 0.099 0.098 0.099 0.091 0.092
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 9 presents the results of logit regressions of CEO network centrality and 
accrual-based earnings management on Beneish (1999) m_scores. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the m_score of a firm in year t, as 
defined by Beneish. (1999), lies in the top quartile of an m_score of all firms in year t. 
Accruals-based earnings management is defined as discretionary accruals that are 
predicted by the error term of the regression as suggested by the performance-matched 
Modified Jones (1991) Model. CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column 
(1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), 
Principal component portion of raw centrality in column (5), and Principal component 
portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All regressions include controlled 
variables as Size (the natural log of total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation of return on 
assets of last three years), Leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), Big4 (indicator 
variable that equals one if audited by “Big Four” auditor), and Op_loss (indicator variable 
that equals one if a firm has negative operating income in year t). All regressions include 
time, industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to a firm’s heteroscedasticity are 
reported in parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is 
designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to this table is shown as: 
Logit (m_score_high) = δ0 + δ1Accruals_EMGt + δ2Centralityt + 
δ3Accruals_EMGt*Centralityt + δControlst + ℇt 
Table 10 reports the results related to F scores, part A for Fscore1, part B for 
Fscore2, and part C for Fscore3 respectively. Similar to results in Table 9, coefficients of 




positive (p < 0.01) in all columns.  Different from results in Table 9, coefficients of all 
centrality measurements (including a portion from interaction term) are negative but not 
significant.  Instead, the interaction terms are negative and highly significant (p < 0.05 for 
four out of six columns). Set Degree centrality (column (1)) in Part A as an example to 
illustrate the marginal effect: Holding other variables constant and at mean value, on 
average, an increase of one unit (1%) in centrality and discretionary accruals equaling to 
1% value of assets will lead to a decrease of 0.014% probability to being in the top 
quartile of Fscore1 (or having misstatement). 
The results from Tables 9 and 10 together show us that controlling for the use of 
accruals-based earnings management, CEO network centrality is related to better or at 
least not bad earnings quality. However, the positive effect of CEO network centrality is 
not significant enough to remove the negative effects brought by the use of earnings 
management to earnings quality. As of now, we have documented empirical evidence to 





Table 10  
 
Dechow et al. (2011) F scores, Accruals-based Earnings Management and  
CEO Network Centrality 
 
Part A: Fscore1 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG 1.695*** 1.641*** 1.310*** 1.713*** 1.293*** 0.944***

























Size 0.0857*** 0.0862*** 0.0852*** 0.0943*** 0.0882*** 0.0883***
(3.87) (3.92) (3.84) (4.20) (3.98) (3.96)
ROAstd 0.0366 0.0329 0.0399 0.0398 0.0394 0.0369
(0.43) (0.39) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43)
Leverage 1.044*** 1.045*** 1.043*** 1.046*** 1.042*** 1.047***
(7.90) (7.89) (7.90) (7.88) (7.87) (7.90)
Big4 -0.411*** -0.411*** -0.413*** -0.402*** -0.413*** -0.409***
(-6.14) (-6.14) (-6.17) (-5.99) (-6.18) (-6.10)
Op_loss -0.558*** -0.557*** -0.558*** -0.550*** -0.556*** -0.555***
(-10.94) (-10.93) (-10.96) (-10.75) (-10.91) (-10.88)
_cons -2.289*** -2.289*** -2.300*** -2.278*** -2.298*** -2.339***
(-3.34) (-3.33) (-3.36) (-3.31) (-3.35) (-3.39)
N 29522 29522 29522 29522 29522 29522
pseudo R-sq 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.103
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 10 (Continued) 
Part B: Fscore2 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG 1.591*** 1.576*** 1.139*** 1.556*** 1.058*** 0.767***

























Size 0.0926*** 0.0976*** 0.0959*** 0.103*** 0.0983*** 0.0965***
(4.08) (4.34) (4.22) (4.50) (4.33) (4.22)
ROAstd 0.0468 0.0417 0.0535 0.0504 0.0534 0.0460
(0.54) (0.48) (0.62) (0.58) (0.62) (0.53)
Leverage 1.155*** 1.161*** 1.157*** 1.164*** 1.160*** 1.160***
(8.61) (8.62) (8.63) (8.64) (8.63) (8.63)
Big4 -0.433*** -0.432*** -0.433*** -0.424*** -0.431*** -0.431***
(-6.28) (-6.26) (-6.28) (-6.14) (-6.26) (-6.24)
Op_loss -0.502*** -0.499*** -0.501*** -0.493*** -0.498*** -0.500***
(-9.56) (-9.51) (-9.54) (-9.37) (-9.48) (-9.51)
_cons -2.562*** -2.534*** -2.551*** -2.517*** -2.539*** -2.523***
(-3.46) (-3.40) (-3.44) (-3.37) (-3.42) (-3.38)
N 28129 28129 28129 28129 28129 28129
pseudo R-sq 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 10 (Continued) 
Part C: Fscore3 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG 2.036*** 1.957*** 1.195*** 1.898*** 1.285*** 0.851***

























Size 0.0792*** 0.0841*** 0.0834*** 0.0907*** 0.0863*** 0.0837***
(3.05) (3.29) (3.21) (3.46) (3.31) (3.21)
ROAstd 0.0328 0.0269 0.0446 0.0392 0.0412 0.0343
(0.31) (0.25) (0.42) (0.37) (0.39) (0.32)
Leverage 1.192*** 1.198*** 1.190*** 1.199*** 1.192*** 1.197***
(8.18) (8.20) (8.19) (8.18) (8.17) (8.20)
Big4 -0.401*** -0.399*** -0.401*** -0.391*** -0.400*** -0.398***
(-5.19) (-5.17) (-5.20) (-5.05) (-5.18) (-5.15)
Op_loss -0.549*** -0.544*** -0.546*** -0.539*** -0.543*** -0.545***
(-9.62) (-9.58) (-9.57) (-9.43) (-9.52) (-9.56)
_cons -2.781*** -2.753*** -2.781*** -2.740*** -2.767*** -2.769***
(-3.34) (-3.29) (-3.33) (-3.27) (-3.31) (-3.30)
N 24723 24723 24723 24723 24723 24723
pseudo R-sq 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.104
Industry Fixed Effect included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 10 presents the results of logit regressions of CEO network centrality and 
Accruals-Based Earnings Management on Dechow et al. (2011) F scores. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the F scores of a firm in year t, as 
defined by Dechow et al. (2011), lie in the top quartile of F scores of all firms in year t. 
Parts A, B, and C present the results for Fscore1, 2, and 3, respectively. Accruals-based 
earnings management is defined as discretionary accruals that are predicted by the error 
term of the regression as suggested by the performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) 
Model. CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column (1), Eigenvector in 
column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), Principal component 
portion of raw centrality in column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of 
centrality in column (6). All regressions include controlled variables as Size (the natural 
log of total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation of return on assets of last three years), 
Leverage (total debt scaled by total assets), Big4 (indicator variable that equals one if 
audited by “Big Four” auditor), and Op_loss (indicator variable that equals one if a firm 
has negative operating income in year t). All regressions include time, industry, and firm 
fixed effect. Errors robust to firm heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-
tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
The regression related to Table 10 is shown as: 
Logit (Fscores_high) = ζ0 + ζ1Accruals_EMGt + ζ2Centralityt + 





CEO Network Centrality, Earnings Management, and  
Subsequent Economic Performance of the Firms 
 
In the previous chapter, we document evidence that CEO network centrality is 
related to not bad earnings quality. Earnings quality is essential to the firms’ information 
environment. On the one hand, firms with better “earnings quality” provide better 
information for investors to examine future performance. On the other hand, 
informational risk can be an unknown risk factor for investors that will affect subsequent 
pricing of the firms’ stocks. It is interesting to test whether CEO network centrality is 
associated with the better or worse economic performance of the firms. Larcker et al. 
(2013) document that firms with more connected boards experience higher growth in 
future ROA, but analysts fail to forecast the important change in fundamentals.  
Therefore, firms with more central board earn higher risk-adjusted returns. We follow the 
logic of the literature to design our test in this chapter.  
Future Change in ROA 
To test the relation between future change in ROA, centrality, and the use of 
earnings management, we use the pooled regression as: 
Regress (ΔROAt+1) = η0 + η1ΔROAt + η2Earnings Managementt + η3Centralityt  
+η4ΔROAt*Centralityt+η5Earnings Managementt*Centralityt+ηControlst+ℇt, (16) 
 
The dependent variable is the one-year-ahead change of ROA. We control for the 
current change of ROA, the level of discretionary accruals, and centrality measurements 
in the regression. Literature defines “earnings persistent” as the ability to use past or 
current earnings information to predict future earnings (Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow & 
Dechiv, 2002; Richardson et al., 2006).  We include interactions between change of ROA 




predictability of current earnings on future earnings. The literature shows that the use of 
both forms of earnings management will lead to the worse future profitability of the firms 
(Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Gunny, 2005).  Since we are interested in seeing the effect of 
CEO network centrality on future profitability with the use of earnings management, we 
also include the interactions between discretionary accruals and centrality to capture the 
interaction effect between these two variables.13 All the variables above are our variables-
of-interest. Following the previous literature (Gunny, 2005; Lacker et al., 2013), we 
include firm size (Size), Book-to-Market equity ratio (BTM), and volatility of ROA 
(ROAstd) to control size effect, growth opportunities, and volatility of profitability. 
Kothari and Sloan (1992) find that current stock return has predictability for future 
earnings, so we include current-year buy-and-hold return (Annual_ret) in the regression. 
Finally, we include sales growth (Growth) in the regression because increase in sales will 
affect future profitability.  
Table 11 presents the result of CEO network centrality and the use of 
discretionary accruals on the firms’ future profitability. In all columns, the current change 
of ROA has significantly negative coefficients (p < 0.01), indicating that an increase in 
the current change of ROA predicts a decrease in future change of ROA. Consistent with 
the previous literature, discretionary accruals also have significantly negative coefficients 
(p < 0.05), meaning the use of accruals-based earnings management will lead to a 
decrease in future change of ROA.  
  
                                                 
13 The inclusion of interaction between network centrality and current change of ROA is to see 
whether network centrality will increase or decrease the predictability of current earnings on future 
earnings. The inclusion of interaction between network centrality and discretionary accruals is to see 










Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ch_ROA -0.489*** -0.389*** -0.347*** -0.369*** -0.415*** -0.268***
(-4.87) (-4.11) (-5.75) (-4.79) (-5.19) (-6.55)
Accruals_EMG -0.113 -0.122 -0.0900* -0.0948 -0.0850 -0.102***





































Size 0.00200* 0.00269** 0.00239** 0.00228* 0.00222* 0.00226*
(1.73) (2.41) (2.06) (1.91) (1.92) (1.89)
ROAstd 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.217*** 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.215***
(5.80) (5.89) (5.75) (5.78) (5.87) (5.80)
BTM -0.00867*** -0.00897*** -0.00845*** -0.00866*** -0.00861*** -0.00873***
(-3.77) (-3.86) (-3.50) (-3.70) (-3.76) (-3.77)
Growth 0.00141 0.00118 0.00171 0.00134 0.00153 0.00143
(0.58) (0.48) (0.69) (0.54) (0.62) (0.58)
Annual_ret 0.0189*** 0.0185*** 0.0191*** 0.0189*** 0.0192*** 0.0189***
(6.84) (6.71) (6.90) (6.76) (6.94) (6.79)
_cons -0.0300** -0.0258* -0.0268* -0.0263* -0.0261* -0.0240*
(-2.20) (-1.92) (-1.94) (-1.93) (-1.94) (-1.69)
N 25944 25944 25944 25944 25944 25944
adj. R-sq 0.116 0.114 0.112 0.114 0.119 0.115
Industry Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 11 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality and 
Accruals-based Earnings Management (predicted by Modified Jones (1991) Model) on 
firms’ future profitability. The dependent variable is one-year-ahead change in Return on 
Assets (ROA). Accruals-based earnings management is defined as discretionary accruals 
that are predicted by the error term of regression suggested by performance-matched 
Modified Jones (1991) Model.  CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column 
(1), Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), 
Principal component portion of raw centrality in column (5), and Principal component 
portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All regressions include interaction terms 
of centrality and discretionary accruals, as well as interaction terms of centrality and 
change in ROA in the current year to capture the interaction effect of centrality on current 
and discretionary accruals and “earnings persistence”. In addition, all regressions include 
controlled variables as Size (the natural log of total assets), ROAstd (standard deviation 
of return on assets of last three years), BTM (book to market equity ratio), Growth (Sales 
growth in year t) and Annual_ret (buy-and-hold return of a firm in year t). All regressions 
include time, industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to firm heteroscedasticity are 
reported in parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is 
designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regression related to Table 11 is shown as: 
Regress (ΔROAt+1) = η0 + η1ΔROAt + η2Accruals_EMGt + η3Centralityt + 




As for centrality measures, except for Degree centrality (having a significantly 
positive coefficient), centrality measurements have an insignificant effect on the change 
of future ROA. 
However, in all columns, the interaction terms between the current change of 
ROA and centrality have significantly positive coefficients (p < 0.05 in five out of six 
columns).  The result indicates that in firms with “more centralized” CEOs, the current 
change of ROA has less predictability for future change of ROA. Since the current 
change of ROA has a “negative” prediction for the future change of ROA, reduction in 
predictability means a “better” future change of ROA.  Finally, the interaction terms 
between discretionary accruals and centrality have an insignificant effect on future 
change of ROA. Overall, in Table 11, we find that CEO network centrality has a positive 
effect on the growth of future ROA when interacting with the change of the current ROA. 
It is worth testing whether the change of fundamentals can be accurately forecasted by 
analysts.  
Analyst Forecast Error 
Results from the previous section show that CEO network centrality has a positive 
effect on the growth of future ROA. It is interesting to analyze whether the future 
earnings information (such as change of fundamental) can be accurately forecasted by 
analysts. To test this hypothesis, we use pooled regression as: 
Regress (Analyst Forecast Errort+1) = λ0 + λ1Earnings Managementt + λ2Centralityt 
 + λ3Earnings Managementt*Centralityt + λControlst + ℇt                     (17) 
 
The dependent variable is one-year-ahead analyst forecast error that is calculated 




by the book value of total assets per share.14 We include discretionary accruals, centrality 
and their interactions as variables-of-interest. Following Liang and Riedl (2014), we 
control for the natural log of the numbers of analysts covering the firms (Coverage), and 
the natural log of average numbers of days between analyst forecast and actual earnings 
announcement date (Horizon) that are found to affect the accuracy of an analyst’s 
forecast. We also include firm size (Size) and Book-to-market equity ratio (BTM) to 
control for size effect and growth potential of firms. Following Brown (2001), we include 
an indicator variable for firms that incurred operating loss in the current year (Op_loss) 
because analysts may overestimate earnings reversion for firms with an operating loss. 
Following Zhang (2006), we include the natural log of one plus firm age (Firmage) to 
control for the uncertainty of profitability for young firms. Finally, we include the current 
buy-and-hold annual return (Annual_ret) to control the possible momentum effect 
(Lacker et al., 2013).  
As can be seen from Table 12, in all columns, the coefficients of discretionary 
accruals are significantly negative (p < 0.01), indicating that the use of accruals-based 
earnings management are associated with negative analyst earnings forecast error (or 
negative earnings surprise); three out of six coefficients of centrality measurements are 
significantly positive (p < 0.05), while all six coefficients for interactions terms are 
significantly positive (p < 0.05 except for 1).  
  
                                                 
14 We use signed rather than the absolute value of analyst forecast error here because we are 










Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG -0.0971*** -0.0873*** -0.0494*** -0.0880*** -0.0526*** -0.0334***

























Coverage 0.00201** 0.00206** 0.00208** 0.00191** 0.00211** 0.00198**
(2.19) (2.24) (2.30) (2.08) (2.32) (2.17)
Size 0.00365*** 0.00376*** 0.00376*** 0.00360*** 0.00379*** 0.00369***
(5.96) (6.24) (6.16) (5.99) (6.15) (6.08)
Annual_ret 0.00138* 0.00142* 0.00141* 0.00139* 0.00140* 0.00137*
(1.79) (1.84) (1.85) (1.80) (1.81) (1.78)
BTM 0.00364* 0.00364* 0.00375* 0.00361* 0.00368* 0.00365*
(1.71) (1.69) (1.76) (1.68) (1.74) (1.70)
Op_loss -0.00876*** -0.00863*** -0.00873*** -0.00885*** -0.00864*** -0.00877***
(-6.21) (-6.14) (-6.16) (-6.28) (-6.14) (-6.23)
Firmage -0.00371*** -0.00373*** -0.00371*** -0.00367*** -0.00370*** -0.00371***
(-5.28) (-5.29) (-5.27) (-5.22) (-5.28) (-5.27)
Horizon 0.00732** 0.00729** 0.00742** 0.00737** 0.00727** 0.00734**
(2.44) (2.43) (2.46) (2.46) (2.42) (2.44)
_cons -0.0713*** -0.0701*** -0.0699*** -0.0717*** -0.0693*** -0.0678***
(-4.28) (-4.21) (-4.18) (-4.32) (-4.17) (-4.07)
N 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106
adj. R-sq 0.055 0.056 0.054 0.056 0.054 0.056
Industry Fixed Effect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 12 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality and 
Accruals-based Earnings Management (predicted by performance-matched Modified 
Jones (1991) Model) on future analysts forecast error. The dependent variable is one-
year-ahead, Analyst Forecast Error, calculated as one-year-ahead difference between 
actual EPS and analyst consensus estimate scaled by average assets. Accruals-based 
earnings management is defined as discretionary accruals that are predicted by error term 
of regression suggested by the performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) Model. CEO 
network centrality is measured by Degree in column (1), Eigenvector in column (2), 
Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), Principal component portion of raw 
centrality in column (5), and Principal component portion of percentile of centrality in 
column (6). All regressions include interaction terms of centrality and discretionary 
accruals to capture the interaction effect of centrality on the current and discretionary 
accruals. In addition, all regressions include controlled variables as Coverage (the natural 
log of number of analysts covering the firm), Size (the natural log of total assets), 
Annual_ret (annual buy-and-hold return of the firm), BTM (book to market equity ratio, 
Op_loss (indicator variable that equals one when the firm incur operating loss in year t), 
Firmage (the natural log of one plus firm age since IPO, with all negative figure adjusting 
to 0), and Horizon (the natural log of average difference between analyst estimate issuing 
date and actual EPS announcing date). All regressions include time, industry, and firm 
fixed effect. Errors robust to firm heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-
tailed statistical significance of the coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, 





The regression related to Table 12 is shown as: 
Regress (Analyst Forecast Errort+1) = λ0 + λ1Accruals_EMGt + λ2Centralityt + 
λ3Accruals_EMGt*Centralityt + λControlst + ℇt. 
The result shows us that CEO network centrality is significantly correlated to 
positive earnings forecast error (or positive earnings surprise). However, the effect is not 
strong enough to remove the negative effect brought by the use of earnings management 
on the analyst’s forecast.  
The results from Tables 11 and 12 reflect that for firms with higher CEO network 
centrality, there may be an unexpected shift in the firms’ fundamentals (future change of 
ROA) that may not be accurately forecasted by analysts. This could serve as a potential 
information risk factor to affect the pricing of the stock. There may be a potential current 
market under-reaction to stocks of those firms. That is why we are interested in 
examining the long-term market reaction of the firms in the next step. 
Long-Term Stock Market Performance 
As documented in previous literature, the use of earnings management will lead to 
poor long-term stock market performance (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Gunny, 2005). 
However, Lacker et al. (2013) show that board connection will result in a better risk-
adjusted return to firms. Therefore, we are interested in examining what net result will be 
for firms with different CEO network centrality to use earnings management. We run the 
following pooled regressions:15 
Regress (Size-adjusted Returnt+1) = ξ0 + ξ1Earnings Managementt + ξ2Centralityt 
+ ξ3Earnings Managementt*Centralityt + ξControlst + ℇt               (18) 
 
                                                 





The dependent variable is one-year ahead size-adjusted return, calculated as raw 
annual buy-and-hold return minus the buy-and-hold return on a size-matched value-
weighted portfolio (based on market-value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firm, 
supplied by CRSP) of firms. We control for discretionary accruals and centrality and 
include the interaction terms between centrality and discretionary accruals to capture 
interaction effects.  Following previous literatures (Fama and French, 1992; Sloan, 1996; 
Xie, 2001), we control for common factors that are found to affect long-term stock 
performance: Proxy for market risk (Beta), Book-to-Market Equity ratio, (BTM), natural 
log of market equity (Log_mkv). and earnings-to-price ratio). In addition, we also control 
for Earnings-to-Price ratio (EPratio). We present the result using OLS regression, but we 
do use Fama MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression model to double check our 
results.16 
Table 13 presents the result related to long-term stock market performances. As 
can be seen from the table, discretionary accruals have significantly negative coefficients 
(p < 0.05) in all columns, stating that the use of accruals-based earnings management will 
lead to a reduction in long-term stock market performance. However, nearly all centrality 
measurements and interaction terms have significantly positive coefficients (p < 0.05), 
indicating that CEO network centrality is associated with positive long-term stock market 
performance. Set Degree centrality (column (1)) as an example to illustrate the marginal 
effect: Holding other constant, on average, a one unit (equal to 1%) increase in centrality 
                                                 
16 In the untabulated analysis, we also use uni-variance test to see whether there’s any significant 
difference in the top and bottom quintile. Each year, we assign companies into a quintile portfolio by CEO 
network centrality. Set degree centrality as an example, we find that the highest centrality group has a 25% 
higher size-adjusted return than the lowest centrality group. The result is significant at 1% level. The result 




will lead to an increase of size-adjusted stock return of 0.093% per year. Increasing from 
25 percentiles (49) to 75 percentiles (78) of degree centrality in our dataset, the annual 
size-adjusted return will increase by around 2.7%. In short, we find that firms with better-
connected CEOs on average earn substantially higher future size-adjusted return 
compared to firms with less-connected CEOs, but the effect is not strong enough to 
remove the negative effect brought by use of earnings management. We document 
evidence that, holding other constant, firms on average enjoy long-term benefits (of stock 











Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accruals_EMG -0.574*** -0.484*** -0.269** -0.480*** -0.456*** -0.244***

























Beta 0.000623 0.000338 0.000652 0.000436 0.00161 0.000351
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.21) (0.04)
Ln_mkv 0.0979*** 0.0977*** 0.0988*** 0.0985*** 0.0982*** 0.0972***
(18.28) (17.77) (16.74) (16.62) (17.61) (16.64)
BTM 0.0298 0.0299 0.0298 0.0296 0.0289 0.0296
(1.38) (1.39) (1.38) (1.37) (1.34) (1.37)
EP_ratio 0.0245 0.0254 0.0248 0.0246 0.0248 0.0256
(0.59) (0.62) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62)
_cons -2.779*** -2.776*** -2.765*** -2.764*** -2.764*** -2.725***
(-16.66) (-16.67) (-16.66) (-16.64) (-16.64) (-16.45)
N 27145 27145 27145 27145 27145 27145
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
Industry Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Table 13 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO network centrality and 
Accruals-based Earnings Management (predicted by performance-matched Modified 
Jones (1991) Model) on future market reactions on a firm. The dependent variable is one-
year-ahead, size-adjusted buy-and-hold return on a firm, calculated as one-year buy-and-
hold return of a firm minus buy-and-hold return on a size matched, value-weighted 
portfolio of firms based on market value of equity deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. 
Accruals-based earnings management is defined as discretionary accruals that are 
predicted by error term of regression suggested by the performance-matched Modified 
Jones (1991) Model.  CEO network centrality is measured by Degree in column (1), 
Eigenvector in column (2), Betweenness in column (3), Closeness in column (4), 
Principal component portion of raw centrality in column (5), and Principal component 
portion of percentile of centrality in column (6). All regressions include interaction terms 
of centrality and discretionary accruals to capture the interaction effect of centrality on 
current and discretionary accruals. In addition, all regressions include controlled variables 
as Beta (estimated from a regression of monthly raw return on CRSP/NYSE/AMEX 
equal weighted monthly return index in the past 60 months) ,Ln_mkv (the natural log of 
market value of equity), BTM (book to market equity ratio) and EPratio (earnings to 
price ratio). All regressions include time, industry, and firm fixed effect. Errors robust to 
firm heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed statistical significance of 
the coefficients is designated as ***, **, and * at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
The regression related to Table 13 is shown as: 
Regress (Size-adjusted Returnt+1) = ξ0 + ξ1Accruals_EMGt + ξ2Centralityt + 












One of the major concerns for the previous results is the direction of causation. 
We provide evidence that CEO network centrality is a determinant for the use of certain 
form of earnings management (Tables 4 and 5). However, CEOs may be hired to improve 
the performance of the firm, including earnings quality. The success of the improvement 
can induce an improvement in the CEOs’ network centrality as well. The possibility of 
double causation leads us to have endogeneity concerns about the results. We use lagged 
one-year network centrality in the regressions related to Tables 4 and 5 and find that the 
result holds.  
 
Centrality Determinants and Excess Centrality 
 
Another concern is that CEO network centrality can be a proxy for omitted 
variables related to other firm-level or personal characteristics, rather than CEO influence 
and power. Following the previous literature (El-Khatib et al., 2015; Fogel et al., 2017; 
Jandik et al., 2016), we regress the actual centrality value on the following determinants: 
firms sale scaled by assets, ROA, leverage, CEO years with the firms, dummy of whether 
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to serve as board director, year and industry dummy to create “excess centrality” that is 
equal to the residuals of the regression (difference between actual value and predicted 
value). In the untabulated analysis, we re-run regression related to Tables 4 and 5 with 
“excess centrality” instead of actual centrality and find similar results. This process helps 
mitigate the concern that our results are due to omitted firm-level or personal 
characteristics proxied by centrality. The method can also be served as an alternative 
method to release the endogeneity concern.17  
 
Use of Other Measurements of Performance-Matched 
Earnings Management and other Regressions 
 
We use other performance measurements, such as lagged ROA, to estimate 
performance-matched accruals-based earnings management to re-run all the regressions 
and find that results hold. We also apply Wang (2006) model to re-run regressions related 




During the CEO transition years, there is more than one CEO for the firms. It is 
difficult to determine whether earnings management decision is made by which CEO. 
When we include all the observations into our regression, this situation will create some 
noisy terms. We re-do all our regressions and find that the result holds. It is worth noting 
that the results related to the choice of earnings management (Tables 4 and 5) are even 
more significant.  
  
                                                 
17 The use of “excess centrality” in the regression is similar to the function of using the 
instrumental variables method. 
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Firm Size Effect 
 
CEOs with higher network centrality may be more likely to manage larger firms. 
To control for possibility that our centrality measurements may be related to potential 
non-linear size effect, we use three different methods used by El-Khatib et al. (2015) and 
Fogel et al. (2017): (1) adding a “large-size” dummy, (b) adding a quadratic term of size 
variable, and (3) dividing the sample into two subsamples based on firm size. Regardless 
of what methods we use, the sign and significance level related to the coefficients of 
centrality measurements (related to Tables 4 and 5) do not change. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the results are due to the firm size effect. 
 
Other Methods to Test Long-Term Stock Market Return  
Related to CEO Network Centrality 
 
In addition to the multi-regression method, we also use the portfolio method. Each 
year, we assign firms into half, quartile, or quintile groups by CEO network centrality 
and run the uni-variant test for size-adjusted return between the top and bottom portfolio. 
There is a statistically significant difference between the top and bottom portfolio. Set 
degree centrality as an example, and our untabulated result shows that the quintile group 
with the highest centrality has 25% higher size-adjusted return than the one with the 
lowest centrality. The result is economically significant that investors can earn size-
adjusted return of about 25% by creating a long-short portfolio based on the quintile of 




For pooled regression related to Table 10, we regress the size-adjusted return over 
deciles, quintile, or quartile rank of independent variables (rather than continuous value), 
the results hold. We also use the Fama MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression rather 










In this paper, we investigate the relationship between CEO network centrality, 
choice of earnings management, and the consequences. By examining the relation 
between CEO network centrality and choice earnings management, we find that CEOs 
with higher network centrality are more likely to use accruals-based earnings 
management (predicted by performance-matched Modified Jones (1991) Model), but less 
likely to use real earnings management (predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) Model), 
after controlling for factors that affect the use of earnings management including the level 
of the other form of earnings management. The result is also robust for the use of a 
different proxy for performance-matched accruals-based earnings management, use of 
lagged centrality figure (to take care of endogeneity concern), and exclusion of 
observations in CEO turnover years. Next, we examine earnings quality related to the use 
of accruals-based earnings management and find that CEO network centrality is 
associated with better (at least not worse) earnings quality (predicted by probability of 
being in the top quartile of Beneish (1999) m_score and Dechow (2011) F scores), after 
controlling for the use of earnings management. As for long-term economic performance, 
we find that CEO network centrality is related to future growth of profitability that is not 




Therefore, firms with higher CEO network centrality has positive long-term 
market reactions (proxied by one-year-ahead adjusted market return). To sum up, we find 
that CEOs with higher network centrality prefer to take risks by using certain types of 
earnings management.  However, with their abilities (by choosing earnings management 
that fit the firms’ situation or handling the earnings management within a certain range), 
the general outcomes (earnings quality and long-term economic performance) are not 
bad. These findings help us understand the function of CEOs’ network centrality from 
another perspective. 
Our results do not indicate that CEOs with higher network centrality prefer to use 
accruals-based earnings management because the method has lower potential cost than 
real earnings management to firms. Rather, we just prove that CEOs with higher network 
centrality are more likely to take risks (maybe choose to use a certain form of earnings 
management that may have higher potential cost).  Nevertheless, with their abilities (to 
choose earnings management that fit the firms’ situation or to handle the level of earnings 
management within a certain range), the use of accruals-based earnings management 
would not cause worse consequences. The results also help us better understand the 
nature of two different forms of earnings management. Accruals-based earnings 
management is normally considered a method that would create more problems for the 
firms. If the use of such a method can be handled within a certain level, it may not cause 
too much harm to the firms. However, the use of real earnings management may lead to 
inefficient use of cash due to the forgoing of profitable projects (with positive NPV). To 





firms than a certain level of adjustment in accruals by different applications of accounting 
estimates.  
The study has some limitations. First, our result indicates that CEOs with higher 
network prefer a certain form of earnings management, but due to the scope limit, we do 
not test the frequency of using such method. Second, one of the general problems for the 
empirical study is the limitation on the sample period. Our sample is restricted to the 
period of 1998-2016 due to the limitation of data from centrality. Our tests are done, and 
the results are robust only for this sample period. Also, there are many ways to estimate 
earnings management. Our findings are based on the most popular estimation methods 
used by literature. 
There is some potential future research related to this topic. First, Bergstesser and 
Philippon (2006), Cheng and Warfield (2005), and Jiang et al. (2010) find that CEO 
equity incentives are associated with the use of accruals-based earnings management to 
meet or beat the analysts’ forecast.  It may be worth studying whether CEO network 
centrality will strengthen or weaken the effect of their equity incentives. Second, in this 
study, we use whether to be in the top quartile of m_score and F scores as proxies for 
earnings quality. There are other definitions of earnings quality, such as earnings 
persistence, accruals, earnings smoothness, timeliness loss avoidance, investor 
responsiveness, restatements, and SEC enforcement release. It may be worth examining 
whether firms with higher CEO network centrality will be associated with better or worse 
earnings quality in a more comprehensive prospect. Finally, since earnings quality is 





capital in the market. Executives’ network centrality can help improve the quality of 
“information” firms by provide to the market, thus possibly help to lower the cost of  
capital.  Examination of relation between network centrality and the cost of capital is also 
a possible topic. With all these analyses, we can have a better understanding of the 
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The Appendix documents the definitions of variables used in this study (Value of all the 








Proxy for accruals-based earnings management at year t: 
the number of abnormal accruals calculated from 
performance-adjusted modified Jones Model (Jones 1991; 
Dechow et al. 1995; and Kothari et al.2005) 
Real_EMG (real 
earnings management) 
Proxy for real earnings management at year t: the amount 
of mean-adjusted abnormal real earnings management 
calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) model, as sum of 
cash flow from operations and discretionary expenditure 
minus abnormal production of inventory (Roychowdhury 
2006); Cohen et al. (2008)) 
Abnormal_CFO  Proxy for abnormal cash flow from operations at year t 
(one component used to calculate real earnings 
management): the number of abnormal cash flow from 
operations is calculated by error term predicted by 
formula (6) 
Abnormal_PROD Proxy for abnormal production cost at year t (one 
component used to calculate real earnings management): 
the number of abnormal production cost is calculated by 
error term predicted by formula (7)  
Abnormal_DISEXP Proxy for abnormal discretionary expenditure at year t 
(one component used to calculate real earnings 
management): the number of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure is calculated by error term predicted by 
formula (8) 
  




Indicator variable that equals to one if lies in top quartile 
of Dechow et al. 2011 Fscores, predicted by regression 
(10), (11), (12), and (13), zero otherwise 
m_score_high Indicator variable that equals to one if lies in top quartile 
of Beneish (1999) m_score, predicted by regression (9), 
zero otherwise 
*We use being top quartile of m and Fscores to proxy for bad earnings quality 
  
CEO Network Centrality: 




Eigenvector  Importance of an individual in the network 
Betweenness 
How often an individual lies on the shortest distance 
between other two members 
Closeness  
Inverse of the sum of shortest distances between an 
individual and other individual in the network 
PCA-Raw 
 




Principal Component of percentile value of four centrality 
measurements 
  
Related to long-term economic performance: 
Ch_roa_lead1 
 
One-year ahead change in ROA, calculated as ROA in 





One-year ahead Analyst Forecast Error in year t+1, 
calculated as one-year ahead difference between actual 
EPS and analyst consensus estimate scaled by book value 






One-year ahead, sized-adjusted buy-and-hold return on a 
firm, calculated as one-year buy-and-hold return of a firm 
minus buy-and-hold return on a size matched, value-
weighted portfolio of firms based on market-value of 




Size Firm size at year t (natural log of assets) 
BTM Book to Market equity ratio at year t, calculated as Book 
value divided by market value of asset, of which market 
value of asset equals to total asset minus common equity 
plus market value of equity  
ROA Return on asset at year t 
Leverage One measurement of leverage (at year t), as total asset 
scaled by total long-term debt 
ROAstd Rolling standard deviation of ROA for past three years 
including current year 
CFstd Rolling standard deviation of operating cash flow on asset 
for past three years including current year 
Cycle Thousand days receivable plus the days inventory less 
days payable (operating cycle divided by 1000) 
Growth Sales growth at year t 
Big4 Indicator variable equals to one if a firm uses big four 
auditors, zero otherwise 
Duality Indicator variable equals to one if CEO also serves as 
chair of board, zero otherwise 






Indicator variable equals to one if a firm incurs 
operational loss in year t, zero otherwise 
Firmage Natural log of one plus Firm age at year t, where firm age 
is calculated as current year minus a firm’s IPO year 
*If the value is negative, adjust to zero. 
Ch_roa Current change in ROA, calculated as ROA in year t 
minus ROA in year t-1 
Annual_ret Annual buy-and-hold return of a firm’s stock in year t 
Horizon Natural log of average difference between analyst 
estimate issuing date and actual EPS announcing date 
Beta Estimated from a regression of monthly raw returns on 
the CRSP/NYSE/AMEX equal weighted monthly return 
index. The regression is estimated using the past 60-
month return.  
Ln_mkv Natural log of market value of equity in year t 
EP_ratio Earnings to Price Ratio, Calculated as Earnings per share 
scaled by Price of stock at the end of year t.  
  
Others (all regressions control for year and industry fixed effect) 
year Used to control for year fixed effect 
ff48 
Fama-French (1998) classifications of 48 industries, used 




















EXAMPLES OF CEOS WITH DIFFERENT 
 





Examples of CEOs with Different Level of Network Centrality 
 
Picture 
    
Name Rex Wayne Tillerson William (Bill) C. 
Weldon 




Chairman and CEO 
of ExxonMobil from 
2006 to 2017  
CEO of Johnson & 
Johnson from 2002 to 
2012 
CEO of Murphy Oil 
Corp from 2009 to 
2012 
Founder and CEO of 
New Oriental 
Education & 
Technology Group Inc 







































Served on board of 
trustees of the Center 





Served as a member 
of the executive 
committee of The 
Business Council; 
Being a long-term 
volunteer and served 
as national president 
for the Boy Scouts of 
America (BSA) 
Served on the board 
of director for 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., HeartFlow, 
ExxonMobil and the 
board of trustees for 
Quinnipiac 
University 
Served on the board of 
Lilis Energy, Inc. 
(NYSE: LLEX); Past 
board affiliations 
included Crestwood 
Midstream GP LLC, 
Crestwood Equity GP 
LLC, Deep Gulf 
Energy LP, and 
Berkana Energy 


















In the year 2006, 
Exxon had 80,000 
employees, did 
business in nearly 200 
countries, and had 
annual revenue of 





with Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates. In 
2009, ExxonMobil 
acquired XTO 
Energy, a major 
natural gas producer, 
for $31 billion in 
stock. Michael 
Corkery of the Wall 
Street Journal wrote 
that "Tillerson's 
legacy rides on the 
XTO Deal." Tillerson 
retired from Exxon 
effective January 1, 
2017, and became 
Secretary of State. 
As CEO, Weldon 
completed some of 
the largest 
acquisitions in the 
company's history,  
including the 
purchase 
of Alza and Pfizer's 
consumer-health 
product line.  
In Weldon's first full 
year as the company's 
CEO, total revenues 
increased from $32.3 
billion to $36.3 
billion and net 
earnings from $5.7 
billion to $6.6 billion. 
In 2011, his last full 
year as CEO, 
revenues were $44.7 
billion and net 




sold two refineries 
(one in Wisconsin and 
one in Louisiana) in 
2011 and tried to focus 
on international 
exploration in places 
around the world, such 
as Congo, Suriname, 
Indonesia, Brunei, or 
even Iraq. However, 
the exploration 
campaign turned out to 
be a big 
disappointment for 
Murphy and incurred 
millions of expenses 
after unsuccessful 
offshore wells. 
Murphy’s stock price 
has about a negative 
20% return for the year 
2011.  
Yu’s first established 
New Oriental School 
in 1993 and converted 
the business into New 
Oriental Education & 
Technology Group Inc 
in 2003, stock of 
which was first traded 
in NYSE starting 2006. 
As the largest provider 
of private educational 
services in China, New 
Oriental offers 
educational programs 
including English and 
other foreign 
languages, overseas 
and domestic test 
preparation courses, 
tutoring, primary and 
secondary school 
education, and online 
education. Yu is 
known as the “richest 
teacher in China, and 
“Godfather of English 
Training.” 
 
